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Turkey's view on NATO through the 
scope of strategic culture theories (2009-
2016) 
C E S A R  V I N K E N  
 
Die Arbeit untersucht und erklärt mithilfe der Strategic Culture Theory, einer konstruktivistischen 
Annäherung an Sicherheitsstudien, die Sichtweise der Türkei auf die eigene NATO-Mitgliedschaft. Eine 
strategische Kultur besteht aus einer Mischung von Narrativen, die die Vorstellungen eines Landes von 
Sicherheit beeinflussen und wiederum die Grundlage für seine außenpolitischen Entscheidungen bilden. Im 
Falle der Türkei lässt sich festgestellen, dass seit den 1980er Jahren ein alternatives Narrativ der 
‘Regionalmacht’ zu dem während der längsten Phase des 20. Jahrhunderts gültigen Narrativ der ‘nationalen 
Einheit’ an Bedeutung gewinnt. Die Jahre, in denen Ahmet Davutoğlu Außen- und Premierminister war 
(2009-2016), markieren eine Zeitspanne, während derer das Regionalmachtsnarrativ eindeutig an Einfluss in 
der Strategiekultur der Türkei gewonnen hat.  
In der vorliegenden Analyse wird gezeigt, dass die sich herausbildende Strategiekultur der Türkei die Art der 
Selbstwahnehmung als NATO-Mitgliedsstaat und die Verhaltensweise innerhalb der Allianz verändert. 
Während Strategic Culture Theories die Zukunft der türkischen Außenpolitik nicht vorhersagen können, 
bieten sie doch eine Bandbreute möglicher erwartbarer Verhaltensweisen an. Die Arbeit veranschaulicht 
diese Verhaltensweisen und ihre Funktionen im Hinblick auf Diskurse und Handlungen der Türkei in 
Beziehung zur Einmischung der NATO in Konflikte in Libyen, der Ukraine und Syrien während der Davutoğlu-
Jahre.   
 
Stichworte: Strategiekultur, Außenpolitik der Türkei, NATO, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Neo-Ottomanismus  
 
This analysis examines and explains the way in which Turkey views its own NATO membership by making 
use of strategic culture theory, a constructivist approach to security studies. A strategic culture consists of a 
mixture of narratives that shape a country’s ideas on security which, in turn, form the basis for its foreign 
policy decision making. In the case of Turkey, it is pointed out that while its strategic culture has during 
most of the 20th century been dominated by a ‘national unity’ narrative, an alternative ‘regional power’ nar-
rative has been gaining prominence since the 1980s. The years of Ahmet Davutoğlu as foreign and prime 
minister (2009-2016) mark a period during which the regional power narrative clearly gained influence in 
Turkey’s strategic culture.    
In this analysis it will be shown that Turkey’s evolving strategic culture is changing the way it sees itself as 
NATO member and the way it behaves within the alliance. While strategic culture theories cannot predict the 
future of Turkish foreign policy, it can offer us a certain range of probable behaviour. How this works exactly, 
is illustrated by looking at Turkey’s discourse and actions in relation to NATO’s involvement in conflicts in Li-
bya, Ukraine and Syria during the Davutoğlu years. 
 
Keywords: Strategic culture, Turkish foreign policy, NATO, Ahmet Davutoğlu, Neo-Ottomanism 
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1. Introduction 
In 2009 Turkey's foreign minister Ahmet Davutoğlu declared: “Turkey is no longer a 
country that reacts to crises, but one that senses crises before they materialize, that 
can intervene in them effectively, and that creates order around itself.”1 These are 
words that fit the self-confidence of Turkey about its position in the world, less than a 
century after it arose from the collapsed remnants of the Ottoman Empire. 
On 24 November 2015 Turkey shot down a Russian military plane at the Syrian border, 
which was presumably violating Turkish airspace. As Turkey is part of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), such an action does not stand on itself. Article 5 
of the alliance's North Atlantic Treaty considers an attack against any of the members 
an attack against all, and requires therefore other member states to come to the aid of 
the assaulted member.2 Although Turkey did not call upon this article, the Russian-
Turkish incident contained all the ingredients to further deteriorate the relations 
between Russia and NATO. Officials quickly tried to prevent escalation. Foreign Minister 
Jean Asselborn of Luxembourg said, “NATO cannot allow itself to be pulled into a 
military escalation with Russia as a result of the recent tensions between Russia and 
Turkey”3, while NATO General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg stated “I think I’ve 
expressed very clearly that we are calling for calm and de-escalation.”4 
Turkey's risky assertiveness is interesting, as is presents us the consequence of the 
confidence we encountered in the quotation from Davutoğlu: an internationally 
assertive Turkey might fulfil a very different role in NATO than it did in the days of the 
Cold War. This is a relevant topic, as not only Turkey has been changing, but NATO 
entered a new era as well. In this thesis we will examine how the two will get along 
together. 
Turkey has been part of NATO since 1952, when the alliance had been in existence for 
only a few years. Even though Turkey has been trying to become part of the European 
                                           
 
1 Cyprus Press and Information Office ‘Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 1-4/05/2009; Davutoglu explains the foreign policy to be followed after ta-
king over from Babacan’. For the sake of readability web links will not be displayed in the footnotes, but can all be found in the bibliography s 
section. 
2 NATO, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty’, 1949. 
3 ‘Putin vs. Erdogan: NATO Concerned over Possible Russia-Turkey Hostilities’, Der Spiegel, 19 February 2016. 
4 Ibidem. 
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Union (EU) for almost as long, it has in a military sense been part of the Western bloc 
for over sixty years. During the Cold War the conflict between the Western world and 
the communist world strongly shaped Turkey’s security policies and put the country 
geopolitically in the west. 
After the end of the Cold War and the implosion of the Soviet Union, many questioned 
what would remain of NATO.5 Although the alliance expanded into Central and Eastern 
Europe and also remained military active, for instance in Kosovo (1999) and 
Afghanistan (2001-2014), NATO struggled to find and defend a raison d'être.6 In recent 
years however, geopolitics in a changed, multipolar world, from the turmoil in the 
Middle East to the increasing assertiveness of Putin's Russia, has pressured NATO to 
reinvent itself. With (military) security back on the agenda in its European member 
states, NATO is trying to form an answer to the question how it can and should 
coherently act in this new reality. 
In this re-energised NATO the role of Turkey is of great importance, as it holds a 
special strategic position as the alliance's easternmost nation. Because of this 
geographical characteristic, Turkey cannot but being involved in many of the recent 
pressing security issues. It is neighbouring war struck Syria and is very close to the 
fighting efforts against Daesh (also known as ISIL or ISIS)7. Moreover, as a host and 
transit for millions of refugees, Turkey has a part to play in this crisis as well, which is 
having many political and security implications across NATO countries. At the Russian 
stage too, particularly tense since the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, 
Turkey has been involved, especially after the plane shooting incident which we 
mentioned earlier. 
With Turkey on the foreground in NATO matters, it is relevant to be able to clearly 
understand the country's NATO membership. By analysing the development of the 
relation between the two actors I will seek to fill a gap in the literature, as surprisingly 
little has been written about Turkey and NATO since the end of the Cold War. Although 
the academic literature has regularly examined Turkey's (security) relations with the 
                                           
 
5 Celeste A. Wallander, ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War’, International Organization, Vol. 54, No. 4 (2000), 705–
35; Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Emerging Structure of International Politics’, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1993), 44–79. 
6 Andrew T. Wolff, ‘The Structural and Political Crisis of NATO Transformation’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, Vol. 7, No. 4 (2009), 476–92. 
7 While the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is known under several names, I will refer to it as Daesh, which is the name used in the Arab 
world, by the Turkish government as well as NATO member states such as France and the UK. 
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EU or the US, or its alignment to the idea of European defence, the analysis of its 
position in NATO has been rather neglected. Of the academic work that we do find on 
the topic, a large part of the studies from the 2000s examined the position of Turkey in 
NATO in the context of EU-NATO relations. The gradual establishment of the EU as 
international actor raised questions on what would happen to NATO as umbrella for 
European defence. Scholars such as Pınar Bilgin, Şeyda Hanbay, Graeme Herd, Ishan 
Kızıltan and Antonio Missiroli contemplated on where Turkey would fit in with these 
developments.8 
More recently, scholars have started to focus on the expanding range of Turkey's 
foreign policy and its consequences for Turkey's relationship with NATO. Gülnur Aybet 
argued that this relationship has especially transformed from 2007 onwards, as NATO 
became more technocratic and Turkey more pro-active. She expected that both actors 
would be able to adjust to a new relationship in which Turkey could take up a more 
driving role.9 According to Serhat Güvenç and S. Özel's assessment from 2012, 
Turkey has increasingly been including NATO in its security calculations, while it at the 
same time consolidated its position and agenda-setting capabilities within the alliance. 
Although the authors noted that the transformation process in the Turkey-NATO 
relationship was marked by some notably independent behaviour by Turkey during 
2007-2010 they conclude that “after two decades of deepening ambivalence towards 
the Atlantic Alliance and its strategic orientation, Turkey made [especially from 2010 
onwards] its final choice for the relevant future to stay in the Western security 
community.”10 Tarık Oğuzlu published several articles on the topic, which rather 
contradict that conclusion. He observed that ‘interest’ has replaced ‘identity’ as source 
of Turkey's commitment to the alliance. Therefore, Turkey's cooperation with NATO will 
                                           
 
8 Pınar Bilgin, ‘The “Peculiarity” of Turkey’s Position on EU-NATO Military/Security Cooperation: A Rejoinder to Missiroli’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 
34, No. 3 (2003), 345–49; Antonio Missiroli, ‘EU–NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP’, Security Dialogue, Vol. 
33, No. 1 (2002), 9–26; Graeme P. Herd, ‘EU–Turkey Clashing Political and Strategic Cultures as Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession?’, in 
Perceptions and Misperceptions in the EU and Turkey - Stumbling Blocks on the Road to Accession., ed. by Peter Volten, Centre for European 
Security Studies (CESS) Harmonie Paper 23 (Groningen, 2009), pp. 47–68; Ishan Kızıltan, ‘Improving the NATO-EU Partnership: A Turkish Per-
spective’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, 2008, 33–46; Şeyda Hanbay, ‘Involvement of Non-Eu European Nato Members in CSDP: The Turkish Case’, 
Baltic Journal of Law & Politics, 2010, 1–26. 
9 Gülnur Aybet, ‘The Evolution of NATO’s Three Phases and Turkey’s Transatlantic Relationship’, Perceptions, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2012), 19–36 (pp. 
34–35). 
10 Serhat Güvenç and S. Özel, ‘NATO and Turkey in the Post-Cold War World: Between Abandonment and Entrapment.’, Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2012), 533–53 (p. 551). 
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increasingly depend on the extent to which the alliance is still relevant to Turkey's 
capabilities to reach its own foreign policy goals.11 
Although Oğuzlu underlined that the ruling the Justice and Development Party (Adalet 
ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) has repeatedly stressed that Turkey's membership to NATO 
(and its EU accession process) have no alternatives,12 his findings do suggest that 
differing perceptions of interests between Turkey and NATO could jeopardise relations, 
because of the changed nature of Turkey's commitment to NATO. It seems therefore 
worthwhile to examine how in recent years Turkey's focus on its own direct foreign 
policy interests have held up with its membership in NATO. 
Although I follow Oğuzlu's basic assessment of change in Turkey's approach to NATO, I 
would argue that his labelling of an ‘interest’ and an ‘identity’ approach is inaccurate as 
it suggests that the latter would not be an attempt to follow Turkey's interests. Jutta 
Weldes wrote on interest formulation that “determining what the particular situation 
faced by a state is, what if any threat a state faces, and what the ‘correct’ national 
interest with respect to that situation or threat is, always requires interpretation.”13 
This means that both the approaches Oğuzlu described tried to follow Turkey's national 
interest, albeit in a different interpretation of what the national interest is.14 
The theoretical framework which I will use in this thesis will be suitable to overcome 
this structural problem on national interests. I will set about my analysis of the change 
in Turkey's relationship with NATO with the help of theories on strategic culture. This 
constructivist approach to security will help us to examine the topic by taking into 
account the structures underlying Turkey's changing ideas on security. Using strategic 
culture as a framework will allow us to observe how Turkey's possibilities for policy 
making are conditioned on the basis of longer term path dependency. It will enable us 
to describe the way Turkey perceives itself in terms of security, which, in turn, can 
explain its behaviour as a NATO member. 
                                           
 
11 Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘Turkey’s Eroding Commitment to NATO: From Identity to Interests’, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 3 (2012), 153–64; 
Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘NATO ve Türkiye: Dönüşen İttifakın Sorgulayan Üyesi’, Uluslararası İlişkiler, Vol. 9, No. 34 (2012), 99–124; Tarık Oğuzlu, ‘Making 
Sense of Turkey’s Rising Power Status: What Does Turkey’s Approach Within NATO Tell Us?’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 14, No 4 (2013), 774–96. 
12 Oğuzlu, ‘Making Sense of Turkey’s Rising Power Status’, p. 791. 
13 Jutta Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1997), 193–237 (p. 279). 
14 Weldes, ‘Constructing National Interests’, p. 276. Weldes called this “the national interest as social construction”.  What Oğuzlu described as 
an interest based approach to NATO can be seen as a formulation of the national interest which focuses on ways to directly strengthen Turkey's 
strategic position as a regional power. See: paragraph 3.2. 
    C E S A R  V I N K E N   
 
 
| 9 
 
GET MA WP 11/2018 
With the gained insights on Turkey's strategic culture we will look at several recent 
cases involving NATO and Turkey to study how Turkey's sometimes wayward 
behaviour and its formal commitment to the alliance create contradictions. The 
research question of this thesis will be: how have changes in Turkey's general strategic 
culture manifested themselves in regards to Turkey's attitudes towards its NATO 
membership during 2009-2016? The chosen timeframe reflects the years Davutoğlu 
was foreign minister (2009-2014) and prime minister (2014-2016), including the 
launch of his 'zero problems with neighbours' policy in 2010. Turkey's assertiveness in 
international politics, which Davutoğlu  represents, grew markedly during this period, 
while the rate of change in Turkey's strategic culture accelerated. Apart from the 
academic literature on these topics, I will rely on news sources and documents and 
statements by Turkish officials to spot discrepancies between the line NATO is following 
and the Turkey's behaviour, driven by its strategic culture. 
The thesis will be structured in the following way: paragraph 2 will be dedicated to the 
concept of strategic culture, its uses, its weaknesses and some ongoing debates. In 
paragraph 3 we will examine what strategic culture means in the case of Turkey by 
establishing and tracing Turkey's 'national unity narrative' and its 'regional power 
narrative'. Once we understand the development of Turkey's strategic culture, we will 
in paragraph 4 turn to its NATO membership. Turkey's accession to the alliance and its 
position during and after the Cold War will all be contextualised within its strategic 
culture. An important observation will be that while Turkey's changing strategic culture 
prompted instances of assertive behaviour on the international stage, as seen in 
paragraph 3, formally its commitment to NATO still relies considerably on its older 
conceptions of security. This will come apparent by studying Turkey's reaction to 
NATO's new Strategic Concept in 2010 and to the 60th anniversary of its NATO 
membership in 2012. Paragraph 5 will explore three cases in order to show how 
Turkey's alignment to NATO is under pressure from the tendencies of its increasingly 
independent foreign policy. We will look subsequently at the cases of the NATO 
intervention in Libya in 2011, Turkey's reaction to the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 and 
NATO's and Turkey's attitudes towards the Syrian Kurdish rebels in the Syrian Civil 
War. Finally, we will discuss the consequences of our findings for Turkey's NATO 
membership in the concluding paragraph. 
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2. On Strategic Culture 
2.1 What is strategic culture? 
In the last decades of the Cold War the dominant (neo)realist views on international 
relations were increasingly challenged by theorists who were focusing on matters such 
as identity, culture, language etc. In the 1990s this direction in International Relations 
became well known as constructivism, a name invented by Nicholas Onuf in 1989.15 
However, the rise of strategic culture as a school of thought in security studies started 
slightly earlier, in the late 1970s, before constructivism had gathered broad following 
through scholars such as Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein.16 Like 
constructivists, the strategic culture theorists challenged realism’s characterisation of 
actors as ‘black boxes’, identical entities whose behaviour is determined by the 
constraints of the system they are manoeuvring in. 
According to strategic culture theorists the behaviour of a security actor is led by its 
view of security. Notice here that strategic culture theorists, like constructivists, regard 
reality as a social construction, in which the behaviour of an actor is formed by its 
particular view of reality. This reality builds on the early or formative experiences of a 
state, and is to some degree influenced by the philosophical, political, cultural and 
cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.17 The particular construction of an 
actor’s view on security then, its strategic culture, encompasses different questions 
such as “when is it appropriate to use force?” or “what is the preferred context to solve 
security issues: alone or multilateral?”. The actor’s point of view in these issues helps 
to explain its perception of threats, its policies etc. Of course, because different actors 
have different strategic cultures their interaction can by no means be calculated in a 
(neo-)realist way, with rationally acting, undifferentiated units. 
The definition of strategic culture that I shall follow in this thesis is the one formulated 
by Kerry Longhurst. According to Longhurst strategic culture is “a distinctive body of 
beliefs, attitudes and practices regarding the use of force, which are held by a 
collective and arise gradually over time, through a unique protracted historical process. 
                                           
 
15 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia, 1989). 
16 Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, ‘The Test of Strategic Culture: Germany, Pacifism and Pre-Emptive Strikes’, SAGE Publications, Vol. 36, No. 3 (2005), 
339–59 (p. 341). 
17 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), 32–64 (p. 34). 
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A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of its original 
conception. It is not a permanent or static feature. Rather, a strategic culture is 
shaped by formative experiences and can alter, either fundamentally or piecemeal, at 
critical junctures in that collective’s experiences.”18 I will discuss some of the aspects 
of her definition below, and will also elaborate on the history of strategic culture and 
its advantages and disadvantages. 
The first to come up with the term strategic culture was Jack Snyder, in his 1977 study 
on the Soviet Union's nuclear weapon strategy. As American realists failed to explain 
the behaviour of the Soviets with generalised game theory, Snyder’s alternative 
approach showed that there was a Soviet strategy which was influenced by “a number 
of factors unique to the Soviet historical experience”19. He stressed that the Soviet 
leaders should not be looked upon as “generic strategists who happen to be playing for 
the Red team, but as politicians and bureaucrats who have developed and been 
socialized into a strategic culture that is in many ways unique.”20 This exactly shows 
how a strategic culture approach can be valuable, and how over the last decades 
scientists such as Colin Gray and David Jones could made use of it. 
Another example of the successful use of strategic culture is Sophia Becker's study on 
German security politics after its reunification in 1990. Whereas neorealists such as 
John Mearsheimer suggested that a unified Germany would bring back the old balance 
of power politics to Europe21, Germany’s strategic culture, now firmly cemented in anti-
militarism, multilateralism and an aversion to leadership, defied these expectations. 
Again, strategic culture was able to explain something which was a puzzling outcome 
for neorealist theory.22 
Unfortunately, the concept of strategic culture has its weaknesses as well. Colin Gray 
pointed out that although strategic culture is strong at spotting and explaining 
tendencies after an event, it fails to predict behaviour (as opposite to game theory or 
                                           
 
18 Kerry Longhurst, Germany and the Use of Force (Manchester, 2004), p. 200. 
19 Jack L. Snyder, ‘The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations’, 1977, 1–41 (pp. 8–9). 
20 Snyder, p. 4. 
21 John T. Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1990), 5–56. 
22 Sophia Becker, ‘Germany and War: Understanding Strategic Culture under the Merkel Government’, Paris Papers, No. 9 (2013), 1–80. See al-
so: John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy after Unification (Redwood 
City, 1998). 
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rational choice theory). Moreover, there is a risk to use an actor’s strategic culture not 
as a framework for behaviour, but to see it as too deterministic, explaining anything 
and everything.23 
Scholars have tried to counter this last point by stating that strategic culture is not 
mechanically deterministic, but that it rather creates tendencies to a particular 
strategic behaviour. Insights in an actor's strategic culture can thus rule out certain 
types of behaviour as very unlikely and others as possible and this way “map a 
corridor of ‘normal’ and ‘probable’ behaviour of states” which can be integrated into 
more comprehensive analyses of strategic choice.24 Johnston observed that in that 
case the literature insufficiently explains through what logic the status or probability of 
these tendencies is decided.25 
He is right about this: when assigning different levels of probability to behaviours for 
an actor, it is up to researchers to categorise these behaviours on the basis of criteria 
which are not standardised and which still fully depend on the creativity of the scholar. 
This is not to say that this stands in the way of good research; however, the lack of 
method makes it hard to compare studies and fully estimate the objective value of 
claims about strategic culture. For the time being the debates on many aspects of 
strategic culture continue. 
2.2 The relation between strategic culture and behaviour 
One of the prominent strategic culture debates is about the relation between culture 
and behaviour. For first generation scholars such as Colin Gray the two are 
inseparable, as the culture functions as context for the behaviour. This was later 
challenged by Alistair Johnston, who sought to formulate a falsifiable theory of 
strategic culture. Johnston noted that if behaviour is an expression of the culture, 
there is no longer anything valuable to say about strategic culture: everything can be 
explained by and brought back to culture, which in itself does not explain anything. 
One can, for example, explain away a defensive posture of a militarily weak European 
                                           
 
23 Longhurst, p. 9; Alan Bloomfield, ‘Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33, 
No. 3 (2012), 437–61 (p. 441). 
24 Christoph O. Meyer, ‘Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing Norms’, Euro-
pean Journal of International Relations, Vol. 11, No. 4 (2005), 523–49 (p. 8). 
25 Johnston, p. 38. 
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Union and a more offensive, strong United States, by producing a near-mystical 
connection under the label of strategic culture. According to Johnston, if strategic 
culture becomes an all-encompassing concept, it cannot be used as an independent 
variable on strategic behaviour and cannot lead to meaningful research.26 
Although Johnston was correct when he pointed out that falsification is being hindered 
by the indivisibility of culture and behaviour, I see this as an inevitability. Gray 
convincingly argued that behaviour cannot be seen free from the influences under 
which it comes into existence. 
“Everything a security community does, if not a manifestation of strategic culture, is at 
least an example of behaviour effected by culturally shaped, or encultured, people, 
organisations, procedures and weapons. […] Although each dimension of strategy can 
be discussed in isolation, all dimensions function synergistically to constitute the 
whole. […] Even when a security community is performing missions that traditionally it 
has not much favoured, if not actually alien, it must behave in a culturally shaped 
manner.”27 
The debate between Gray and Johnston has never been solved and was more recently 
picked up again by Alan Bloomfield. Bloomfield attacked the work of Carnes Lord, who 
is regarded, like Gray, as a strategic culture scholar of the first generation. Bloomfield 
noted that Lord in his work, confusingly, first found the United States' strategic culture 
an outcome of “all things strategic”, while later describing it is as a cause of strategic 
policy and behaviour. Bloomfield thus concluded that Lord failed “to untangle the lines 
of causation” between his variables. This way strategic culture had become a 
tautology, being both cause and effect.28  
I would argue, however, that the relation between strategic culture and many of the 
things strategic is one of mutual influence. It is true that strategic culture is formed by 
strategic factors, but this in turn causes behaviour by actors that shapes the strategic 
variables by which it was first formed. The feedback loop this creates is sometimes 
neglected by scholars, which overly or solely focus on strategic culture as an outcome. 
                                           
 
26 Toje Asle, ‘Strategic Culture as an Analytical Tool History, Capabilities, Geopolitics and Values: The EU Example’, No. 14 (2009), 3–23 (p. 7). 
27 Collin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (Oxford, 1999), pp. 132–35. 
28 Bloomfield, pp. 439–41. 
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In this thesis I will try to consider both the elements that formed a strategic culture 
and their consequential behaviour, and especially the dialogue between the culture and 
the behaviour. 
The issue Bloomfield raised, points basically at the same problem Gray and Johnston 
argued about. The inability to falsify strategic culture and to describe how it relates to 
strategic actors is an important unresolved issue, that will keep dividing strategic 
culture scholars. However, there are more questions to ask when dealing with strategic 
culture and trying to characterise it.  
2.3 Measuring strategic culture 
Once a strategic culture is defined, it is important to keep in mind that it is not static. 
Strategic cultures change, causing security actors to opt for different solutions in 
different points in time. The difficulty is how to determine the process that drives 
change in strategic culture. Scholars have not yet decided on a standard procedure to 
map this and have come up with different methods.  
Longhurst, for example, identifies two ways in which strategic culture can change: 
fine-tuning and fundamental change. The first form manifests itself as behaviour of a 
security actor reacting to external or internal events which challenge the security 
culture as it is established at that moment. Challenges press the actor to fine-tune 
security policies in such a way that its 'core values' suit the new situation. 
Fundamental change, on the other hand, is a rarely occurring, radical change in 
security culture which can take place when a severe or traumatic event obsoletes the 
existing strategic culture. The subsequent quick acceptance of new core beliefs, can in 
a short period of time lead to the establishment of fundamentally new practices and 
policies.29 
Alternatively, the workings of strategic culture can be approached in terms of long and 
short-term changes. This is not the same as Longhurst's method, for she was rather 
looking at the pervasiveness of changes in strategic culture (gradual change by slight 
fine-tuning or thorough change through milestone events). Thus, for example, the 
process of change in strategic culture can be described with a focus on slow 
                                           
 
29 Longhurst, p. 18. 
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movements such as demographic changes or long term economic tendencies.30 Such 
approaches remind of Fernand Braudel's view of history as a series of stacked time 
layers. “Event history” happens only within the structures of the long-term frame of 
the longue dureé.31 Although there are different factors to highlight in these time 
structure views on strategic culture, they all have in common that they stress the stern 
resistance of strategic culture against change. In doing so they play down the power of 
agency in strategic culture, as they suggest actors have a limited ability to try to 
establish changes in strategic culture as they will always to some extent have to rely 
on the (external) movements of the larger structures. 
The issue of agency comes with its own problems. Apart from the question how much 
strategic culture is externally driven (by external processes or actions of other actors), 
it is not clear who is responsible for the formation of a strategic culture. Although it 
seems generally accepted that strategic culture is “an aggregate level of the most 
influential voices in terms of attitudes and behaviours”32, and thus consists of some 
interplay between elites, its precise realisation is an unclear process. Sometimes 
scholars also try to include other factors such as the role of the media and mass 
movements into the mixture.33  
Bloomfield advocates the use of “strategic cognitive schemas”, or subcultures, for the 
analysis for strategic culture. According to him an emphasis on the subcultures, which 
coexist and compete for influence, would clarify many current problems about the 
interpretation of strategic cultures. Changes in what strategic subculture is dominant 
could explain changes in strategic policies of state actors.34 This is an important aspect 
to take into consideration - also in the Turkish case, which has a strong ideological 
divide between the ruling Islamist AKP and the strongly secular Kemalists. 
However, I would contest the idea suggested by Bloomberg that a state's security 
policy is fully dictated by the subculture that is dominating the strategic culture. The 
                                           
 
30 For example: Jeannie L. Johnson, ‘Strategic Culture: Refining the Theoretical Construct’, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 2006, p. 
25; Rodney W. Jones, ‘India’s Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategic Cultures Curriculum, 2006, p. 6; Thomas Gomart, ‘Russia Alone Forever? 
The Kremlin’s Strategic Solitude’, Politique Étrangère, 2008, 23–33. 
31 Fernand Braudel, ‘Histoire et Sciences Sociales: La Longue Durée’, Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations, Vol. 13, No 4 (1958), 725–53. 
32 Asle, p. 4. 
33 Meyer, pp. 22–23, 27. 
34 Bloomfield, pp. 451–56. 
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way the dominant subculture manifests itself and which of its characteristics are 
highlighted should be related to the subcultures it is competing with. It is not as simple 
as saying a state is from that period to that period 'possessed' by one subculture, while 
the next is “waiting in the wings”35, ready to take over. Rather, a dominant subculture 
might be reacting against of being influenced by other subcultures. It might anticipate 
on its competitors by 'lending' certain characteristics, or it might be highlighting 
attributes especially contrasting with the preferences of its competitors. This in turn 
might move the state's strategic culture in one or another direction. Therefore the 
interplay between the subcultures and the way they ultimately reflect on the strategic 
culture should not be neglected. 
The analysis of subcultures is a complicated matter. Although one subculture can be 
dominant, it is hard to nail down what groups or what actors are part of this subculture 
and are driving it, beyond the obvious leading party officials. In the case of the AKP 
single-party government, for example, we could confidently include the party's local 
officials and members and the government aligned press as part of the subculture. But 
as we draw the circle broader, including NGOs with ties to the government or the civil 
servant apparatus, it becomes increasingly precarious to understand the mechanics of 
the AKP government as dominant subculture. These actors, which stand further from 
the subcultures elite, influence the workings of the subculture through indirect 
processes. The composition of the AKP subculture forms a worthy topic for analysis in 
itself, from which I unfortunately will have to refrain. In this thesis I will therefore have 
to refer to the AKP elite without further investigation of subculture mechanics. 
Likewise, for the sake of attainability, I will in paragraph 3 on Turkey's strategic culture 
not get into a detailed account of all the Turkish governments and their specific 
subcultures and counter-cultures. Instead, a general outline of the developments in 
Turkey's strategic culture will have to do. The later paragraphs will focus on the AKP 
subculture, for I regard it as vastly influential in Turkey's contemporary strategic 
culture. Additionally there will be references to the Kemalist subculture, which forms 
an important opposition force. 
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The way I will be handling the characteristics which a strategic culture consists of, is by 
referring to 'narratives'. Margaret Somers explained that narratives can present 
different versions of the past, the present or the future of a social group to depict a 
coherent version of what a group is. These narratives have a strong forming influence 
on social relations between individuals and in constructing social organisations. 
Eventually they can shape social life itself.36 
In the next chapter I will present two narratives which give two very opposite 
interpretations of security. Different subcultures can adopt these narratives, or parts of 
them and to varying degrees. Although not usual in strategic culture analysis, I regard 
it necessary to add this extra layer on top of the previously described contest of 
subcultures: different subcultures can by times borrow from the same narratives, 
sharing certain believes with some subcultures, while differing on other points. 
Moreover, we can point out in this way that subcultures, like global strategic culture, 
are not static either: the importance of certain narratives within subcultures can grow 
and diminish over time. 
Figure 1. depicts how the strategic culture mechanism works. Different subcultures 
hold different ideas on security. The beliefs of a subgroup is a particular composition of 
narratives, which have different degrees of influence. The country's strategic culture is 
shaped by the subgroups, one of which might be dominant. The strategic culture, then, 
provides a certain range of possible behaviours which we can expect from a country. 
                                           
 
36 Margaret R. Somers, ‘The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach’, Theory and Society, Vol. 23, No. 5 (1994), 
605–49. 
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Figure 1. How strategic culture, subcultures and narratives relate (figure by author) 
3. Turkey and Strategic Culture 
Now we have studied the theory of strategic culture, let us look at the case of Turkey. 
As we examined in the previous paragraph, strategic culture is an amalgam of the 
preferences of different groups that possess power in Turkey, where any dominant 
group will be especially conclusive. While the groups can refer to different narratives, 
constructions of the world which contain a set of preferences, they might never fully 
align with the 'ideal type' version of the narrative. In our discussion of Turkey I will 
bring forward two different narratives. 
We will first see how Atatürk's idea of “peace at home and peace in the world” 
connected the ideas of national state security at the domestic front with Turkey's 
foreign policy behaviour through the national unity narrative. We will then see how the 
strategic culture under this national unity narrative, which was held up by the 
Kemalists (those inspired by Kemal Atatürk), has increasingly been challenged by a 
narrative that presents Turkey as an assertive regional power. Especially under the 
rule of the AKP, which came into power in 2002, this narrative gained strength. Once 
we understand this shift in strategic culture we can see how this reflected on Turkey's 
role in NATO. 
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3.1 National unity narrative 
The Ottoman defeat in the First World War, the collapse of the empire and the 
subsequent establishment of the Kemalist Turkish state led to a sudden change of 
course for Turkey's strategic culture. It was a rare instance of fundamental change, as 
we saw described by Longhurst, in which Turkey's core values were reshaped. The new 
republic opted for a strong state and a weak civil society37, and composed a strategic 
culture which was obsessed with the territorial integrity of the state and which followed 
what I will call the national unity narrative. 
An important determinant for this was the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), in which Western 
powers partitioned the lands of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty caused a deep 
suspicion towards the intentions of foreign powers about Turkey up to the point that it 
has been described by scholars as the Sèvres Syndrome. Sèvres fuelled a narrative 
among the Turkish elites that foreign powers were trying to undermine Turkey and 
were tirelessly attempting to further interfere with its domestic politics through 
aggregating internal (ethnical) conflicts. In fact, causes of Turkey's internal problems 
were often sought and found in external factors, such as plotting foreign countries.38 
Therefore Sèvres is of great importance to understand Turkey's strategic culture. The 
focus on national unity and territorial integrity kept a firm control on any possible 
domestic disturbances. In the early years of the republic several Kurdish rebellions 
were harshly suppressed. In addition, the Kemalists continuously tried to curb what 
they perceived as political extremism from both the communist and socialist Left and 
the religious Right. The sceptic attitude towards Western powers stemming from 
Sèvres is something that we will encounter later in the context of Turkey's NATO 
membership as well. Thus Sèvres links the Kemalist strong state with Turkey's foreign 
policy behaviour and general strategic culture.39 
Another characteristic of the national unity narrative which was dominating Turkey's 
strategic culture in this phase was a reluctance to get involved in the conflicts of 
others. We can trace a long period in which Turkey tried to stay unaligned, as was the 
                                           
 
37 Metin Heper, The State Tradition in Turkey (Beverley, 1985), p. 16. 
38 Dorothée Schmid, ‘Turkey: The Sèvres Syndrome, or the Endless War’, Franco-Turkish Paper, No. 13 (2015), pp. 10–11. 
39 Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle, 2003), p. 109. 
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case in the Second World War, and during which it largely lacked foreign policy 
initiatives. There are some notable exceptions to this, such as the Baghdad Pact of 
1955 and the invasion of Cyprus in 1974.40 And of course Turkey was as a member of 
NATO involved in the Cold War in general. We will see, however, that it had several 
reasons to join the Western camp. Meanwhile, other regions, especially the Middle 
East, were almost neglected for decades. After being in a semi-constant state of war 
from the first years of the 20th century until the Liberation War in 1923, Turkey's 
strategic culture rarely produced appetite for grand foreign endeavours. 
3.2 Regional power narrative 
Against the national state security narrative we can formulate a strategic culture based 
on what I will call the regional power narrative. The narrative presents Turkey as a 
potential regional powerhouse, which ought to play a more assertive role in 
international politics, especially in its neighbourhood. The regional power narrative is 
closely connected to Turkey's neo-Ottoman overtures, but not necessarily the same. In 
order to make a strong case for Turkey's necessity to play a regional role, a period is 
sought and found in Turkish history and put in the narrative. Where the regional power 
narrative works for Turkey by using the Ottoman past, other countries could make 
their own variation of the same principle. It would be like Spain building ambitions 
based on its imperial past, or Hungary by reflecting on the old Kingdom of Hungary.  
Thus in my view neo-Ottomanism is a tool for this particular regional power narrative. 
However, neo-Ottomanism comes with its own particularities, such as its multinational 
outlook and its appreciation of Islam as a binding feature. Because of this it was the 
Ottoman past that was attractive for the AKP and the political tide of parties based on 
the tradition of Islamism, and not a regional power narrative based on, for instance, 
pan-Turkism or the Byzantine past. Still, Turkey's activities, from deepening its ties 
with South America41 to expanding strategic cooperation with China42, should rather be 
viewed as part of its quest to rise on the international stage, than having to do with 
Ottoman peculiarities. I therefore chose to name the narrative a 'regional power' 
                                           
 
40 The Cyprus conflict is somewhat different because it involved the Turkish community on the island state. It was therefore depicted as a natio-
nal cause and defended by Turkey so fiercely that it did not waver in the face of economic sanctions by its own allies such as the United States. 
41 ‘President Erdoğan Visits South America, Hails Stronger Trade Ties’, The Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion 
Agency, 11 February 2016. 
42 ‘China, Turkey Upgrade Ties to Strategic Cooperative Relationship during Wen’s Visit’, Xinhua News, 9 October 2010. 
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narrative, in which neo-Ottomanism is used as a tool. Let us now look at neo-
Ottomanism, and at exactly how the argument for regional power is fuelled. 
A central figure in neo-Ottomanism (yeni Osmancılık), whose words opened this thesis 
and whom we recurrently will encounter, is Ahmet Davutoğlu. Before becoming foreign 
minister (2009-2014) and prime minister (2014-2016) for the AKP, Davutoğlu had 
already published many academic works on international relations and had advised the 
party during the 2000s. He can be regarded as an important constructor of Turkey's 
security narrative. 
Davutoğlu presented his ideas most clearly in his 2001 book Stratejik Derinlik: 
Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Strategic Depth: Turkey's International Position). He 
used the military term 'strategic depth' to refer to the hidden strategic potential Turkey 
has to improve its geopolitical situation. As a country which is according to Davutoğlu 
part of both the Middle Eastern, Balkan, Caucasian, Central Asian, Caspian, 
Mediterranean, Gulf and Black Sea regions, Turkey has a special and rare 'central 
power' position. This geographical advantage makes it possible through strategic depth 
to play a leading role in many regions at the same time through the use of soft power. 
In the book he also stresses the importance of path dependency, which means that 
Turkey cannot deny its historical, Ottoman experiences for the formation of its 
policies.43 
Davutoğlu's neo-Ottomanism (a term he always rejected himself) should not be 
confused with the ideas advocated by Necmettin Erbakan, the leader of several Islam-
oriented political parties which in a way preceded the AKP. Erbakan, who had a strong 
influence on Turkey's former prime-minister and current president Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, represented a vision in which Turkey should actively break with the West in 
favour of an Islamic alliance with countries such as Libya, Iran, Malaysia and 
Indonesia. Rather than to shift away from the West, Davutoğlu looked for a way to let 
the East and West form complementary parts of Turkey's outlook. This reflects his 
appreciation of the Ottoman past, in which the Turks were at the centre of a large 
multinational empire.44 
                                           
 
43 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye’nin Uluslararası Konumu (Istanbul: Küre Yayınları, 2001); Iohannis N. Grigoriadis, ‘The Da-
vutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy’, Hellenic Foundation for European 7 Foreign Policy Working Paper, No. 8 (2010), pp. 4–5. 
44 Ömer Taşpınar, ‘Turkey’s Middle East Policies: Between Neo-Ottomanism and Kemalism’, Carnegie Papers, No. 10 (2008), pp. 14–15. 
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According to Ömer Taşpınar, neo-Ottomanism means a “willingness to come to terms 
with Turkey’s Ottoman and Islamic heritage at home and abroad.” Because the 
Ottoman heritage and Islamic religion have in this framework become important 
shared characteristics of Turks with other peoples (contrasting with the Kemalist 
narrow view on national unity), neo-Ottomanism takes up a new mindset on many 
issues, including security and citizenship. On citizenship Taşpınar explains: 
“neo-Ottomanism sees no major threat behind Kurdish cultural rights and the 
expression of Kurdish national identity, as long as Kurds maintain a sense of loyalty to 
the Republic of Turkey. Similarly, when faced with Kurdish demands for cultural and 
political rights, the neo-Ottoman mindset prefers to accommodate such demands in 
the framework of multiculturalism and Muslim identity. In other words, unlike Kemalist 
hardliners who insist on assimilating the Kurds, neo-Ottomanism allows Islam to play a 
greater role in terms of building a sense of shared identity.”45 
The stress on these commonalities is very important for Turkey's regional power 
narrative. By using neo-Ottomanism, strategic culture under the regional power 
narrative looks back at the pre-republican period and the times the Ottoman Empire 
was exercising far-reaching control across the region. More than just a concern with 
the Ottoman Empire itself, the regional power narrative comes with a general attitude 
that suits an empire. Fundamentally, it acknowledges Turkey's own potential to play a 
leading role in the region. Moreover, its pursuit of regional dominance comes with a set 
of characteristics that contrasts with the national security narrative. It guarantees a 
more outward looking strategic culture, as Turkey's active pursuit to dominate the 
neighbourhood as its regional power presses it for decision making that has impact on 
other countries. 
One can argue this quest for regional power, fits in with larger trends in which new 
geopolitical centres of gravity challenge the unipolar, US-driven world system that has 
been in place since at least the end of the Cold War. Important representatives of this 
efforts are the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), which as emerging 
economic powers seek a larger role in international affairs. The idea that Turkey should 
play an independent, regional role fits with the emergence of a multipolar system 
                                           
 
45 Taşpınar, ‘Turkey’s Middle East Policies’, p. 15. 
    C E S A R  V I N K E N   
 
 
| 23 
 
GET MA WP 11/2018 
which challenges the dominance of the West in general and the US in particular.46 We 
will see later that Turkey can in a sense be related to the BRIC countries because of 
this. 
Turkey's self-confidence in foreign policy can be traced further back to the 1980s, 
when president Turgut Özal engaged in initiatives that opened up economic ties with 
several (Middle-Eastern) countries, as part of a broader process of liberal economic 
reforms.47 Under the AKP government, however, it is much more clearly present, as is 
shown by Turkey's many and diverse foreign policy initiatives. Since the 2000s we 
have seen many initiatives underlining Turkey's new belief it can and should expand its 
international influence. Apart from its zero problems policy in the Middle East and its 
engagement with Russia (both of which we will discuss below), the last decades have 
seen periods of effort to solve problems with neighbours Armenia, Cyprus and Greece. 
Apart from the confidence to make Turkey a regional power, we can find reasons in 
this narrative as to why it should do so. This is where neo-Ottomanism is brought in. 
In his writings Davutoğlu criticised Turkey's past policies under the national unity 
narrative. He wrote that “during the Cold War Turkey pursued a foreign policy that was 
resting on a military strategy that only aimed to protect its borders rather than resting 
on a strategy that would realize the full potential of its international position. Turkey 
interpreted its international position within the narrow parameters of its defence 
strategy.”48 
Instead of focussing on its territorial integrity, Davutoğlu suggested that because of 
historical and geographical reasons Turkey was obliged to take a regional approach in 
foreign matters. According to him, “historical factors force Turkey to develop a defence 
strategy that goes beyond the contextual influence of its current borders. It is 
impossible for a country like Turkey, which was founded on the historical and 
geopolitical basis of the Ottoman state and inherited a legacy from the Empire, to 
design a defence strategy that is confined to its current borders. This historical legacy 
                                           
 
46 Emre Erşen, ‘Rise of New Centres of Power in Eurasia: Implications for Turkish Foreign Policy’, Journal of Eurasian Studies, Vol. 5 (2014), 
184–91. 
47 Sedat Laçiner, ‘Turgut Özal Period in Turkish Foreign Policy: Özalism’, USAK Yearbook, Vol. 2 (2009), 153–205. 
48 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, p. 73. Original quotation: “Turkiye Soğuk Savaş donemi boyunca uluslararası konumdan çok, sınırlar boyu bir 
guvenlik anlayışına dayalı dış politika ve askeri stratejiler oluşturmuş ve uluslararası konumu bu güvenlik anlayışının dar kapsamı içinde yorum-
lamaya calışmıştır.” 
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can generate de facto situations which Turkey has to step in at any moment.”49 
Although Davutoğlu does not illuminate what “situations” he means exactly, it is clear 
from his argument that the Ottoman heritage demands Turkey to play an active role in 
the matters of its smaller neighbours. Indeed, an important asset of the regional power 
narrative is the idea that it is natural for Turkey to take up this role in the region. This 
idea can be an important determiner for its foreign policy behaviour. 
To sum up, a strategic culture under the regional power narrative approaches Turkey's 
security in a very different way than the national unity narrative does. National 
security is not confined to Turkey's own borders, but because of historical, 
geographical and cultural reasons, reaches across the whole region. As consequence of 
these ideas this strategic culture thus gives a broad space for the pursuit of regional 
power status, a rebalancing of policies from a western orientation towards an 
independent, multifaceted outlook and international activism. The regional approach is 
domestically linked to a different image of the Turkish nation, in which national 
unitarity is abandoned in favour of a more inclusive, heterogeneous approach. After all, 
the Ottoman Empire too existed of many ethnicities and religious groups. 
3.3 The change from national unity narrative to regional power narra-
tive 
As we concluded previously, Turkey's security behaviour at no point corresponds fully 
with one of the narratives. One reason is that, as discussed earlier, a strategic culture 
characterised by, for example, a focus on national integrity and a lack of international 
assertiveness can still produce seemingly contradictory behaviour50, although these 
instances are expected to be rare. Another reason is that different narratives on 
security might be competing at the same time. Even if, for instance, the national unity 
narrative is dominant, counter-narratives might still influence the security behaviour of 
an actor. This means that at no time a strategic culture will consist of some pure 
version of one of the previously described narratives. 
                                           
 
49 Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik, p. 41. Original quotation: “Turkiye'yi cari uluslararası sınırların konjonktürel etkisinin ötesinde bir savunma 
stratejisi geliştirme zorunluluğu ile karşı karşıya bırakmaktadır. Osmanlı Devleti’nin tarihi ve jeopolitik zemininde doğmuş bulunan ve o mirası de-
vralan Türkiye’nin savunmasını sadece sahip olduğu sınırlar içinde düşünmesi ve planlaması imkansızdır.” 
50 For instance, Turkey's alliance forming initiative of the Baghdad pact in 1955. 
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This is important to keep in mind when examining the change in strategic culture 
Turkey has witnessed. At no time Turkey's strategic culture was monolithically 
consisting of the national unity narrative, nor does or will the regional power narrative 
completely replace the previous narrative. However, we can say that in the last 
decades the regional power narrative has become more prominent and is being 
propagated by the AKP government, which forms a dominant subculture in the Turkish 
political system. We can find this push to adjust the strategic culture widely in the 
discourse of the party. 
We saw how Davutoğlu provided a theoretical base for an active Turkish policy in the 
region. The duty of Turkey to live up to its role as heir of the Ottoman Empire is put 
into practise with a discourse that actively promotes a positive image of the Ottoman 
era and the role the empire played. By calling on shared histories under the former 
empire (in which the Turks were of course holding a centre position, not only 
geographically but also politically) he suggests that it is natural for Turkey to continue 
its friendly (but directing) ties with its neighbours. 
In regards to the Balkans, for example, growing Turkish regional influence is 
accompanied by Davutoğlu's message that “We have a common history and cultural 
depth with the Balkan countries [..] The Balkans had its golden age of peace during 
the Ottoman reign. This is a historical fact. Those who blame the Ottoman period for 
the region’s economic backwardness and internecine fights are under the influence of 
historical prejudices and stereotypes”51 We can see here how Davutoğlu paves the way 
for re-engagement with the region by alluding that “economic backwardness and 
internecine fights” could be prevented if only the Balkan countries would stay close to 
Turkey's harmonising influence. 
In the Middle-East too, the AKP government relies on Ottoman heritage to legitimate 
its increased engagement with the region. Its discourse on the Arab World contrasts 
with that from the Early Republican period, in which the region was depicted in a 
negative and backward way.52 The view that rebelling Arabs had betrayed the Turks in 
the final years of the Ottoman Empire was corrected by Erdoğan. He stated about the 
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Early Republican period that “Turkey's relations with the Middle East were cut with the 
extremely incorrect and improper slogan, “the Arabs betrayed us””.53 Instead he 
continuously gave (historical) reasons why Turkey should engage with Arab countries. 
Following the regional power narrative Erdoğan contended that it is for Turkey “very 
natural to be in touch with Middle Eastern countries” and that “Turkey has a lot to do 
in the Middle East. We are aware of this responsibility. We are here for this.”54 
The historical perspective is applied by other officials as well. For example, when AKP 
deputy Fahri Keskin talked about the trade agreement between Turkey and Yemen and 
the relations between the countries he said that “Yemen has a special and important 
place in the hearts and memories of the Turkish people. Located in the south of the 
Arabic Peninsula, it stayed under Ottoman rule for centuries. This period was a time of 
peace, stability and welfare for Yemen. Historically, Yemen was a close witness to the 
magnificence and power of the Ottomans as well as how it was betrayed by others.”55 
In other words, the Yemenis have good reason to long for the Ottoman era. Moreover, 
the Turks Yemen is dealing with now, have a direct connection with the Ottoman 
relations of the past. Just as the Ottomans made a positive impression on them, the 
Yemenis (naturally) translocated their sympathy to contemporary Turkey. 
Similarly, at the African Day in 2011 president Abdullah Gül approached the 
establishment of relations between Turkey and African countries from an Ottoman 
angle. By saying that “the Ottoman Empire always supported the African people in 
their struggles against the colonial powers. [..] Historical relations with North and 
Northeast Africa have an exclusive place in the memories of our people”56, he 
establishes a connection with the Ottoman Empire and in that way hints to the political 
significance of contemporary Turkey. As if the current Turkish Republic is no different 
or less significant than the empire that once (arguably) stood by the African people. 
                                           
 
53 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ‘Changing Balances and Rising Importance of Turkey, Speech at USAK’, 3 February 2010. 
54 ‘Turkey Ready to Take Role in Mid-East Process’, Hürriyet Daily News, 2005. 
55 ‘Minutes of the Proceedings of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Fahri Keskin, 2003 Vol. 27, Session 6, 56’, Turkish Grand National As-
sembly. Original quotation: “Bizim milletimizin kaderinde, halkımızın zihninde, halkımızın gönlünde Yemen'in ayrı yeri ve önemi vardır. Yemen, 
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In another example, Yaşar Büyükanıt, chief of the general staff, as well propagated 
indirectly Turkey's involvement in the neighbourhood through the Ottoman heritage. 
He said that “In the Middle East, various ethnic and religious groups lived under the 
reign of the Ottoman Empire. We should ask why there had not been any conflict 
between them for centuries”57 
Finally, the following example on the Syrian crisis by Erdoğan shows how the regional 
power narrative is fuelled by history and how it forms a rhetorical base for 
assertiveness in the region. Erdoğan said: “We do not see the Syrian issue as an 
external affair; the Syrian question is our internal affair. We share with them a border 
of 850 kilometres. We have ties of kinship, history and culture. Therefore we cannot 
passively watch what is happening. We need to do whatever is necessary.”58 
All these examples provide an idea of how the AKP government puts forward a new 
view on security. Sometimes the earlier republican conceptions of security and 
international policies are directly challenged. The many efforts by AKP officials to 
establish a positive link between the Ottoman times, the Ottoman region and the role 
contemporary Turkey can play there, nudge Turkey's strategic culture in a new 
direction. 
However, as argued before, the change in strategic culture in Turkey is not complete. 
Oppositional groups may share different ideas about security. For example, the 
oppositional Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), which received 
over 25% of the votes during the November 2015 parliamentary elections, holds on to 
Kemalist principles and additionally is opposed to neo-Ottoman thinking.59 Moreover, 
the dominant governing party's own views might be ambiguous. One can for instance 
point to the fact that, notwithstanding the emancipative reforms the AKP brought, 
groups such as the Alevi religious minority and the Kurdish ethnic minority are in legal 
terms still held back. This means that the thought from the early-Republican national 
                                           
 
57 Yaşar Büyükanıt (2008), ‘Speech delivered at the 5th Symposium titled “Middle East: Ist Future, Uncertainties and Security Issues” at War 
College’, Istanbul, 06/05/2008. 
58 ‘Erdoğan, Davutoğlu’nu Şam’a Gönderiyor’, Habertürk, 6 August 2011. Original quoation: “Çünkü biz Suriye konusunu dış sorun olarak 
görmüyoruz. Suriye meselesi bizim bir iç meselemizdir. Çünkü Suriye ile 850 kilometre sınırımız var. Akrabalık, tarih, kültür bağlarımız var. 
Dolayısıyla burada olanlar, bitenler asla bizim seyirci kalmamıza fırsat vermez. Gereğini yapmak zorundayız.” 
59 Serkan Demirtaş, ‘AKP’s Adventurist Policies Turning Turkey into an Incompetent Country in Mideast: CHP’, Hürriyet Daily News, 26 June 
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unity narrative, which stressed (among other things) the uniformity of the Turkish 
nation, still endures at some level. 
4. Turkey and NATO 
We will now look at Turkey's NATO membership, from its early years and the Cold War 
to the recent decades and the restructuration of the alliance. We will encounter 
different grounds for Turkey's behaviour, sometimes based on identity, sometimes on 
interest. Our gained insights in Turkey's strategic culture will help us to analyse 
aspects of its NATO membership and recognise that the grounds for its behaviour are 
connected to the earlier examined security narratives. 
4.1 Establishment of NATO and Turkish membership 
How we should see NATO and its founding has been a topic of extensive writing. 
According to Sireci and Coletta, the foundation of NATO was based on purely realist 
arguments and should be seen as a power balancing act by the United States.60 
However, Sean Kay insists that over time embedded community values in the alliance 
such as “reinforcing democracy and free market economies” became of growing 
importance. These characteristics put their mark on NATO even stronger because they 
contrasted with the ideology of the Soviet bloc.61 
One can argue that throughout the Cold War the continuing existence of the East-West 
divide increased the importance of mentioned normative component. While realist 
reasons brought the allies together, the continuing projection of the NATO members as 
the 'self' versus the 'others' of the Warsaw Pact amplified the existing associations. 
Shared perceptions of threat, resulting from the similarity of identities among the 
members determined the success of the alliance. According to Risse-Kappen this 
common identity came into being through the members' shared norms and regulative 
practices, such as consultation and consensus-building. In this sense, “common values 
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and a collective identity of liberal democracies”62 did play an important role in fuelling 
the raison d'être of NATO as they led to common threat perceptions.63 
However, in any discussion of NATO, we cannot underestimate the importance of the 
US within the alliance. Not only was the US the strategically determining factor to 
establish the alliance, up to this day it is highly dominant in military terms. It is 
responsible for over three-quarter of the combined military budget of all members.64 
Because the American predominance in NATO's actions and influence on its course, in 
many recent issues that we study actors alternate in their comments between calling 
on NATO's actions and the US' actions. This is especially the case in campaigns based 
on a 'coalition of the willing', such as is the case in, for instance, the effort against 
Daesh. While all NATO member states expressed support for the campaign, only a few 
actively participated (and especially the US). Although the dynamics between Turkey 
and the US play without a doubt a role in Turkey's ties with NATO, I will try to keep all 
observations centred on just the alliance as much as possible. 
At the time of NATO's birth in 1949, Atatürk's rule and the establishment of the 
republic still lay fresh in Turkey's memory and its strategic culture was very much 
dominated by the national unity narrative. Therefore joining a military alliance to 
counter Soviet power was for Turkey not the most expected thing to do. There was, 
however, a mix of realist and identity motives that drove Turkey into the alliance. 
While joining NATO fitted in with Turkey's Westernisation effort (see below), Soviet 
aggression gave even stronger, realist arguments. After the Second World War, while 
the map of Europe was being divided in American and Soviet spheres of influence, 
Stalin also made claims on Turkish territory. He demanded the Kars and Ardahan 
provinces in the east and wanted permanent Soviet bases in the Bosphorus and 
Dardanelles. This would give the Soviets joint control over the Turkish Straits, and 
strategic access to the Mediterranean Sea. Stalin stepped up his claims with troop 
movements at the Turkish borders with Bulgaria and the Caucasus.65 These particular 
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Soviet threats took place directly after the Second World War and had started to fade 
by the time Turkey actually joined NATO in 1952. Nevertheless, the geographic 
proximity to the Soviet Union, at the time still under the capricious Stalin, and its 
offensive capabilities, made the realist arguments still relevant.66 
The issue of Turkey's identity was more complicated. Identity-wise choosing for NATO 
membership was for Turkey a show of commitment to a Western identity. The years 
after the Second World War were an active time for Turkey's political westernisation. 
Before Turkey's NATO membership was achieved under the newly elected Democratic 
Party (Demokrat Parti), it had already taken part in the Marshall Plan of 1947 and had 
become a member of the Council of Europe in 1949 under the CHP. Moreover, Turkey's 
earliest attempts to become part of the European Union (then the European Economic 
Community) stem from the late 1950s. With these actions, Turkey acknowledged that 
it regarded its identity as part of the Western system. This is in line with the quest for 
Westernisation that had been started under Atatürk, but which roots can be traced 
further back to Ottoman times.67  
But while being part of NATO was, apart from all its security concerns, a sign for 
Turkey that it was both politically and culturally part of the West, there was at the 
same time a certain ambivalence towards the alliance. While we saw earlier that 
NATO's coherence was strengthened by processes of shared identity building against 
the 'other' Soviet bloc, Turkey's case shows a counter-mechanism, working against 
Turkey's smooth integration into the alliance. As Karaosmanoğlu points out, Turkey's 
identity formation builds upon the centuries old role of the Ottoman Empire in the 
European system.68 For centuries, the Turks had been projected by European states as 
'the other' themselves. From the times in which the Ottoman armies were besieging 
Vienna and threatening the Christian world to the later years in which it got the 
reputation as the 'sick man of Europe', the Ottoman Empire had been an outsider. At 
best the Ottoman Empire could be “an irregular and peripheral member of the 
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European framework”69 The suspicion of Turkey, with its complicated mix of Western 
and Islamic and Eastern identity, to be 'otherised' by the West, and the enduring 
Sèvres Syndrome (discussed previously) put a damper on its enthusiasm to try to be 
part West.70 
There was therefore something odd about Turkey's NATO membership. On the one 
hand did the national unity narrative, which was important in this period, provide a 
reason to join the alliance, as it strengthened the Westernisation project which Atatürk 
used as part of his nation building process. On the other hand, however, the same 
narrative also opposed integration into NATO, because of its isolationist tendencies and 
the particular historical suspicion towards the West. 
As for Turkey's behaviour within the organisation during the Cold War, Tarık Oğuzlu 
observes that the country behaved rather passively within the organisation. Whereas 
its elites were prone to think of Turkey as an influential strategic actor on its own, 
whenever NATO adopted decisions Turkey acted as if it did not take part in their 
formulation. “The prevailing discourse used to be that decisions within NATO were 
made in Brussels between the USA and other important European allies and that 
Turkey responded to them”.71 As Turkey was not only the alliance's south eastern 
stronghold against the Soviet Union but also was the member state with the second 
largest army, it clearly had the potential to take part more actively. Of course 
Turkey's attitude fits with the influence of the national unity narrative on its strategic 
culture as it kept the country uninterested in an assertive membership. 
 4.2 After the Cold War 
After the Cold War it was not clear what was going to happen with NATO. From a 
realist perspective alliances should not outlive the threats they were created to 
address. With the disappearance of the common goal it was expected by many that the 
alliance would fall apart, as reasons for cooperating ceased to exist.72 With the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union, therefore, NATO faced the daunting task of reinventing 
itself in order to have a raison d’être in the upcoming years.  
While NATO was busy reorienting itself, Turkey stayed part of the Western military 
bloc. Though with a scent of resignation, it kept following the alliance's course as NATO 
transformed into a security community which directed itself to threats such as 
international terrorism. It supported the enlargement of NATO into Central-Europe and 
was particularly devoted in NATO's military missions to Bosnia, Macedonia and 
Kosovo.73  
In the 2000s new dynamics emerged both in international context (after the 2001 
terrorist attacks in the United States) and because of domestic developments (2002 
marks the beginning of AKP rule in Turkey). Following the assertiveness of the George 
W. Bush administration, Turkey joined NATO's missions to Afghanistan and other non-
European places, although simultaneously a more critical or sceptical view emerged.74 
We can follow the Turkish (government) perspective on this development by looking at 
the writings of Davutoğlu.  
We already noted that Davutoğlu constructed ideas which are leading for Turkey's 
regional power narrative. He also presented his vision on NATO and the future of the 
organisation. In a 2012 article he fully subscribed to its continuing importance. He also 
underlined the importance of identity to NATO by writing that the alliance was 
“determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisations of their 
peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and rule of law. So 
long as our common values need protecting, NATO would continue to have a raison 
d’être.”75 Elsewhere he wrote about that Turkey's membership to NATO “is a solid 
symbol of Turkey’s Western vocation and her choice of joining with democratic 
societies governed by universal values.”76 
However, as the last decade saw action by NATO in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and at the 
Somalian coast, Davutoğlu expressed his concern that the alliance's character was in 
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danger of shifting to a military tool, “imposing and implementing political decisions 
taken elsewhere”77, specifically hinting at the military dominance of the US. He argued 
that this was bad for the legitimacy of NATO. Here we can trace arguments that have 
been made by scholars that put limits to Turkey's commitment to NATO. Two major 
components of Turkey's foreign policy under AKP were not antagonising Russia 
(although this point was abandoned in 2015, later more on that) and keeping its 
“hard-gained positive image across the Islamic world”.78 These preferences, with their 
implications for Turkey's look on NATO, can be found in Turkey's official foreign policy 
of 'zero problems with neighbours'.  
The zero problems doctrine was presented by Davutoğlu in early 2010 and was aimed 
at solving Turkey's strained relations with countries in the (Middle Eastern) 
neighbourhood, including Syria and Iraq. More in general, the idea behind the policy 
was for Turkey to diversify its focus. By directing itself more towards the Middle East it 
would gain more economic and political opportunities to establish itself as a regional 
power.  
This raised some concerns among Western observers, as Turkey had traditionally 
avoided the complicated Middle Eastern intrigues in favour of engagement with Europe. 
It was therefore claimed that the zero problems doctrine, rather than an attempt to 
catch up with neglected neighbours was a turn away from the West. It was, moreover, 
perceived as a proof of the AKP's reorientation towards the Islamic world as part of a 
general Islamisation policy. Finally, it was said that Davutoğlu's vision was a neo-
Ottoman one, aimed at reviving the glory days of the former empire. All these claims 
were denied by the Turkish government.79 
Initially the zero problem doctrine surprised with its successes. Turkey saw its relations 
improve with countries such as Iraq, Iran and especially Syria, and it actively mediated 
in conflicts all over the region. The revolutionary wave in Arab countries that started in 
December 2010 for a moment seemed a golden opportunity for Turkey to promote 
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itself.80 However, as civil war broke out in Syria and the Arab Spring turned into a 
Winter, the gains of Turkey's foreign policy were quickly offset. By 2016, after a 
decade of zero problems with neighbours, Turkey found itself in a position in the 
Middle East where it arguably was “more isolated than ever”.81 
Although not in the Middle-East, Turkey's engagement with Russia is definitely related 
to Davutoğlu's attempt to expand the reach of its foreign policy well. Instead of staring 
itself blind at the West, as often happened in Turkey's old Kemalist policies, the AKP 
government considerably intensified relations with Putin's Russia. Although we will 
explore in chapter 5.2 how this diplomatic path clashed with NATO's preferences with 
the outbreak of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, it for now suffices to say that engagement 
between the two countries had been intensifying. That year, Russia was Turkey's 
number one import country, and seventh largest export partner.82 In the same year 
Turkey and Russia rolled out plans to increase their trade volume threefold by 2020.83 
Moreover, the personal chemistry between Putin and Erdoğan and their critique on the 
West brought Russia and Turkey together, up to the point that there were hints in 
2013 that Turkey might want to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.84 
Although rhetoric about joining this Russian-Chinese security bloc possibly just served 
for Erdoğan to gain diplomatic leverage against the West (especially the EU), the very 
fact that he was prepared to bring it to table is a sign of how loose Turkey's alignment 
with its traditional Western allies had become at the time.  
Until the breaking of Russian-Turkish relations in December 2015 Turkey and Russia 
were mentioned together and compared with each other. Significantly, when prime 
minister Erdoğan took up the function of president in 2015, many were reminded of 
Putin's institutional acrobatics in which he swapped the presidency for the prime 
ministership and back, each time taking with him the executive powers to rule the 
country.85 
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Turkey's engagement with Russia, just like its independent endeavours in the Middle 
East, were clear signals of the new self-confidence on the international stage Turkey 
gained under AKP rule. Whatever the AKP's real intentions of the increased focus on 
the East and the zero problems doctrine were, the consequence was in any case a 
more diversely orientated foreign policy with the potential to clash with the interests of 
NATO.  
Like Turkey befriending Russia became problematic when Russia and NATO clashed 
over Ukraine, the fact that the AKP was being very active to establish a good image in 
the Muslim world, could lead to disagreements with the NATO line. Ankara was careful 
to point out that “NATO should not be considered as an instrument forcing regime 
changes in predominantly Muslim countries”86, an echo of which we encountered in 
Davutoğlu's article. The dilemma of how to combine Turkey's NATO membership duties 
with the preservation of its reputation in the Islamic world is shown, for instance, by 
Turkey's preference to perform only civilian and crisis management tasks in 
Afghanistan, instead of combat action.87 This would prevent the suggestion of Turkey 
being involved in some anti-Islamic effort by NATO. Another sign is Turkey's full 
support for the enlargement of the alliance into the Balkans. The inclusion of 
Montenegro and Macedonia, with large Muslim minorities, and Albania, a Muslim-
majority country, would help to make NATO's image more multi-religious and to proof 
that it is not an army of Christian imperialists.  
These are just a few examples of how Turkey's behaviour within the alliance is 
influenced by the fact that NATO's direction and Turkey's foreign policy preferences 
often did not align well. From Davutoğlu's argumentation we can understand how an 
assertive NATO with business in the Middle East or with Russia could spoil Turkey's 
own foreign policy. Oğuzlu explained how Turkey's behaviour in NATO is purely based 
on strategic determination. As his main principle is that Turkey, as a rising power, is 
trying to gain geopolitical importance, he sees for Turkey two basic ways to behave 
within NATO. In the first way Turkey would try “counterbalancing the most influential 
members of the alliance by making use of intra-alliance cleavages and by spoiling the 
alliance by contributing to its irrelevance”. This way Turkey would be able to exploit 
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the alliance for its own interest. Alternatively it could try to co-opt with the main 
players within NATO and shape its own national interests and foreign policy in line with 
the priorities of the alliance. In this second scenario Turkey would use NATO as a 
“force multiplier” of its preferences.88 
Oğuzlu finds examples of both co-opting and counterbalancing behaviour in the 2000s, 
giving a mixed picture of Turkey's role in NATO. A closer look at Turkey's 
counterbalancing against the US or other influential NATO forces shows that it mainly 
involved attempts to mitigate relations with Russia and issues that harm Turkey's 
“hard-gained positive image across the Islamic world”.89 
This behaviour is in line with what we would expect, as it is specifically directed against 
NATO behaviour that would be contradicting the preferences of Turkey's strategic 
culture. As the regional power narrative aims for an independent geopolitical position 
for Turkey in which it can actively reshape its neighbourhood, it is not surprising that 
Turkey plays a more interest based role within NATO. Especially at topics that directly 
concern Turkey's regional power status we can count on direct clashes with NATO 
there where the alliance has different interests.  
Turkey's changed strategic culture explains therefore that Turkey does only moderately 
share the interests of the United States and the EU countries in their confrontation with 
Russia, and that it is careful when a NATO policy can damage its plans in the Middle 
East. We can also see why it makes sense for Turkey's regional power narrative 
incorporating Balkan countries into NATO. Having a group of friendly satellites with 
common cultural and historical (Ottoman) ties within the alliance would obviously 
improve Turkey's position. The very fact that Turkey is concerned about how it can 
bend NATO to its will is a consequence of its desire to be a regional power and is 
inspired by its strategic culture.  
All these, however, are policy specific considerations. As we will see now, Turkey's 
formal rhetoric on NATO does not really reflect the change in strategic culture which 
we just marked. 
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4.3 NATO's new Strategic Concept and 60 years of NATO Member-
ship: Contemplating on Turkey's NATO position in the 2010's 
The new Strategic Concept is NATO's most recent ten-year plan and has been a 
milestone in its post-Cold War functional modernisation and transformation. The 
document contained not only a reconfirmation of the old core tasks of territorial 
defence, but also defined how to handle new focuses such as cyber defence and non-
traditional forms of terrorism. Finally the document reiterated a commitment to 
cooperation with prospective members and with Russia.90 When the alliance adopted 
the new Strategic Concept on 20 November 2010, Turkey's foreign policy had already 
been guided by Davutoğlu's ideas of strategic depth for several years. Turkey's “zero 
problems with neighbours” policy had been launched half a year earlier. 
At the time journalists observed in this period an increasing frequency of 
disagreements between NATO and Turkey, indicating an axis shift of Turkey's foreign 
policy.91 However, we do not recognise this image at all when we examine the article 
published by Turkish Defence Minister Vecdi Gönül (in function 2002-2011) in the 
Turkish Policy Quarterly, in which he explains his views on the new Strategic Concept. 
In positive wordings on the alliance, he encourages further evolution towards a more 
political organisation and a continuation of the expansion of the alliance. According to 
Gönül “NATO has played a central role in the security of Turkey for 58 years. The 
Alliance has made significant contributions for Turkey to be integrated in the Euro-
Atlantic community. Turkey has made significant contributions to the Alliance as well. 
It adopted the common values the allies share, and defended them keenly.”92 In his 
article there seems to be a lack of any connection with Turkey's neo-Ottoman 
ambitions and possible reservations these could raise towards NATO. Gönül does not 
seem to share Davutoğlu's concerns about NATO as an interventionist tool, also when 
commenting on far away missions such as Afghanistan and the anti-piracy missions off 
the Horn of Africa. If anything, he seems to encourage a more active alliance. 
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In a interview by NATO Review with the (Turkish) Assistant Secretary General for 
Defence Policy and Planning of NATO, Hüseyin Diriöz, we also find Turkey agreeing 
with the conclusions of the new Strategic Concept and the identified threats of 
terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks, the disruption of 
the flow of energy supplies and instability or conflict beyond NATO's borders. Diriöz 
confirms that “Turkey too has identified these and similar risks and challenges to its 
national security. Therefore, clearly, the threat perceptions of NATO as a whole and 
Turkey are essentially parallel.”93 
In a 2011 interview by NATO, Ismet Yılmaz, who had just become Turkey's new 
minister of Defence, expressed his ideas about Turkey and NATO and the new 
Strategic Concept in harmonious terms as well. According to him: “For Turkey, NATO 
means turning towards the West. A concrete expression of heading towards core 
human rights and the rule of law. You head towards the direction where you see your 
own security. Turkey's security is in the West. Turkey's preference is also the West.[..] 
With Turkey joining NATO in 1952, Turkey showed that its fundamental choice is the 
West and NATO.” Later Yılmaz summarises Turkey's foreign policy with Atatürk's 
classic motto: “In Turkey we have a very basic principle: peace at home, peace in the 
world”.94 
Although we find unwavering enthusiasm for NATO and Turkey's NATO membership, 
we can also find a glimpse of the regional power narrative. That Yilmaz proudly lists 
the many areas and missions in which Turkey participates is hardly surprising. 
However, he also presents a strongly assertive attitude, underlining, for instance, how 
Turkey, with help of NATO, will be capable of steering the Middle East and solving 
conflicts in the regions. He also mentions Turkey's grown influence because of its 
recent economic growth. In addition to this show of self-confidence, we find a last 
reference to Turkey's regional power capabilities with a link to the Ottoman Empire. 
When explaining why Turkey has an important role to play for NATO in the Middle East, 
Yılmaz remarks: “Turkey knows the region better than outsiders. We have lived 
together for approximately 400 years. Even 500 years in some cases.” In this quote he 
puts the beginning of Turkey not with the establishment of the republic under Atatürk 
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but in the times of the Ottoman Empire. “We” are Ottomans, who had relations with 
the peoples of the Middle-East several centuries ago. 
The next year, for the occasion of Turkey's 60 years of NATO membership, Speaker of 
the Grand National Assembly Cemil Çiçek's anniversary message stated that “We are 
proud of NATO's work to ensure peace and security.”95 He continued to explain that 
Turkey itself had made many important contributions to the alliance and that it will 
continue to fulfil its duties. Finally, Haydar Berk, Turkey's Permanent Representative to 
NATO, said something among the same lines: “NATO is a fundamental dimension of 
Turkey's foreign and defence policy. Turkey has been an important member for 60 
years and is a reliable part of the alliance.”96 
One characteristic shared among all these remarks is a full support for Turkey's NATO 
membership. This is something we can expect from these representatives who have an 
interest in presenting a positive picture towards an international audience. At the same 
time, however, there is a striking neglect by the Turkish state to provide up to date 
information on NATO. The official English statement on NATO on the website of the 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which specifically mentions it deals “current issues”, 
starts with the proud announcement that Turkey will celebrate its 60th anniversary of 
its membership in 2012.97 From statements on Russia and Ukraine (and lacking ones 
on for instance Syria) we can also establish the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not 
updated its NATO page since 2010 or 2011, shortly after the implementation of the 
New Strategic Concept. 
The Turkish version of “Views on Current Issues of the Alliance”98 is considerably 
longer. Sections on new topics have been added, while old ones have not been 
updated. While some other English and Turkish pages on NATO are slightly more up to 
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date than the main NATO page, the texts generally present outdated information which 
has not been revised in the last four years. 99 
All this does not necessarily have anything to do with NATO itself, and might rather be 
a sign of a malfunctioning bureaucracy than of a conscious neglect of the 
representation of the alliance by Turkey. Although other Turkish ministries suffer from 
the same problem100, from the much outdated official view on NATO we might at least 
assess that the Turkish administration does not regard the impression it makes on 
NATO allies as a priority. 
While the extensive text on Turkey's view of NATO expresses many ways in which 
Turkey is important for NATO, it brings forward only one argument why NATO is 
important for Turkey: “Turkey’s membership to NATO is an integral part of her global 
identity”.101 Positioning itself explicitly as part of the North-Atlantic community, 
neglects the idea that Turkey should equally balance its Western and Eastern 
affiliations. However, it does not come as a surprise that the statement underlines that 
Turkey places itself in the Western community, as doing otherwise would seriously 
undermine the credibility the statement would give Turkey in the alliance. 
The statement concludes that “Turkey maintains its position within NATO by protecting 
its national interests as well as supporting the solidarity within the Alliance.”102 
Mentioning the importance of national interests like this is not unique. For instance, 
Turkey's neighbour Greece declares in a similar statement on NATO that it is “guided 
by the promotion of its national interests.”103 But when we compare Turkey's 
statement on its view on NATO with older versions which were presented by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we do notice that older versions from 2001 and 2004 did 
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not contain a single reference to Turkey's national interest.104 In this official policy line 
we thus find this small reference to Turkey's independent course. 
In a series of interviews conducted by NATO Review on Turkey's 60 years of 
membership to the alliance, we find some answers that paint a slightly different 
picture. Özgür Hüseyin Ekşi, a correspondent for the (not government-aligned) 
Hürriyet Daily News, answers to the question “How have Turkey's foreign policy 
priorities changed?” that the current government wants to play “a bigger role in the 
Middle East than ever”, especially in regards to the ongoing Arab Spring. He continues 
that the current government follows a more pro-Islamic and pro-Arab line.105 These 
answers are in itself not remarkable, but differ from the statements on NATO by 
representatives which we encountered earlier, as they rather underlined Turkey's 
commitment to the West. 
Sinan Ulgen, who is connected to the think tank Carnegie Europe, gives an interesting 
answer to the question what NATO means for Turks today, by bluntly noting that: “the 
Turkish population views Turkey's role within NATO as being rather insignificant. And 
therefore there is a perception that NATO policy is essentially dictated and 
implemented by other powers than Turkey.”106 These observations are in line with 
statistical data, according to which Turkey is the member state with the lowest public 
support for NATO. Indeed, the share of Turks who believe that NATO is 'essential' 
declined from 53 percent in 2003 to 30 percent in 2010. These numbers are associated 
to increasing disillusionment with the West, especially over EU membership.107 
Yurter Özcan notes in 2011 in this regard a striking difference between the activities of 
the political elite, which generally acts by word and deed in line with Western and 
NATO concerns, and the low public support and interest for both NATO and the US. In 
between these two worlds he places the rhetoric in the domestic sphere by some 
Turkish actors, notably Erdoğan, which is recurrently anti-Western and in contradiction 
with the actual political decisions that are made by Turkey: 
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 “Even though Erdoğan criticizes Western intervention in certain parts of the world as 
‘imperialist’ or ‘solely-driven for material benefit,’ he actually continues to support 
those interventions in an active manner. His criticism with such an anti-Western tone 
contradicts the very positions that Erdoğan himself takes. [..] With the exception of 
the 2003 resolution [on intervention in Iraq], it is fair to say that AKP has assisted the 
U.S. virtually in every major occasion since it came to power in 2002.”108  
According to Özcan's theory the implication of the constant use of this tone is a gradual 
discreditation of the West and NATO among the Turkish population. This would 
naturally significantly influence Turkey's position in NATO in the long term. 
In the official statements on the new Strategic Concept and the 60th anniversary of 
Turkey's NATO membership, we generally found a discourse that tells us that Turkey is 
a fully devoted member of the alliance. More importantly, in these cases the old 
narrative persists about how being part of NATO proves Turkey's choice to be part of 
the West. The sweeping changes in Turkey's foreign policy in the last decade, and the 
ideas about region balancing in order to build an independent foreign policy with 
regional ambitions are hardly reflected. Moreover, other observers commenting in 
NATO channels, such as Sinan Ulgen and Özgür Hüseyin Ekşi, gave us an idea of what 
these officials could have mentioned as well. The fact that there is gap between the 
official rhetoric and the real situation might also be shown by the interesting case of 
low public support for NATO, which is not represented at all in the official statements. 
In this paragraph we observed that while many officials, including Davutoğlu, 
expressed their support for Turkey's alignment with the West and its position in the 
alliance, we also saw that there are several considerations that might cause a 
contradiction between this official Turkish line and its actual preferences. In the next 
paragraph we will look at three cases in which we can follow how the regional power 
narrative unfolds in practice in episodes in which Turkey and NATO have to come into 
action. 
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5. Turkey's current position in NATO 
5.1 NATO's intervention in Libya (2011) 
When the new Strategic Concept was adopted in November 2010 no one expected the 
revolutionary wave in the Arab world that began one month later and all the 
implications it would have for NATO. In the next year the alliance intervened in the 
Libyan Civil War, where Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's government was about to crush 
the rebel movement. After the instalment of a no-fly zone in March and the bombing of 
loyalist military positions, Operation Unified Protector largely contributed to the fall of 
the Gaddafi regime in October 2011. 
We will first shortly study general debate regarding the question if its intervention was 
justified or not, before turning to the specific events surrounding Turkey's aversion and 
then contribution to the NATO intervention. After that we can analyse the case to see 
what it tells us about Turkey's strategic culture. 
The intervention, which received a UN mandate, followed earlier condemnations from 
the UN and regional organisations including the African Union, the Arab League, the 
Gulf Cooperation Council and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference. The many 
reports on human rights abuses by the Gaddafi regime against rebels led to 
widespread calls for action, especially after March 17, when Gaddafi famously 
threatened civilians who did not comply with his rule “We will come house by house, 
room by room [..] We will find you in your closets. We will have no mercy and no 
pity.”109 In legal terms, the NATO intervention was backed up by the concept of 
'responsibility to protect' which had been endorsed and defined by the UN in 2005, and 
which sought to protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. 
Although the UN Security Council had initially backed Resolution 1973, which was used 
by the NATO countries as their mandate for action, several parties started to regret 
this shortly after. As soon as the attacks on Libya had started, Russia, China and the 
African Union reacted negatively on the military intervention and many political actors 
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and scholars have questioned if NATO has militarily overreached its mandate with the 
way it interpreted Resolution 1973.110 
Apart from the question of legality of the intervention, many observers initially lauded 
NATO's actions on humanitarian grounds. David Clark wrote in the liberal newspaper 
The Guardian that the historical experience of the aftermath of suppressed Arab 
rebellions such as in Syria (1982) and Iraq (1991), which were characterised by large 
scale atrocities, made it plausible something similar had been prevented in Libya.111 At 
the time NATO itself too was confident in putting forward the intervention itself as a 
success. Writing shortly after the fall of the Gaddafi regime had been accomplished, 
Ivo Daalder (US Permanent Representative to NATO) and James Stravridis (Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe and Commander of the US European Command), stated that 
NATO's action in Libya “rightly has been hailed as a model intervention”, and argued 
that NATO's involvement “demonstrated that the alliance remains an essential source 
of stability”.112 
By 2015, however, as Libya was descending into chaos, Daalder's tone had become 
cautiously more critical. He admitted that “There was an underestimation of the 
potential for violence and disagreement and the breakdown of the country into 
opposing militia forces.” and that NATO had apparently not yet found the “goldilocks 
solution” for how to intervene in countries in turmoil.113 
Since the fall of Gaddafi many have criticised Operation Unified Protector for 'killing' 
the UN's new legal concept 'responsibility to protect' by significantly overstepping its 
mandate. As result of the debacle “everywhere outside Western Europe and North 
America R2P [right to protect] is losing what little ethical credibility it ever 
commanded.”114 Alan Kuperman denounced the intervention for several other reasons. 
Firstly, he questioned the reality behind the humanitarian grounds. Not only was the 
rebel movement violent from the beginning, contradicting the idea of innocent 
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protesters being trampled by the regime's armed forces, Gaddafi's troops did not 
target civilians or resort to indiscriminate force. Secondly, he argues that the 
intervention, which came at the moment the rebels were almost defeated and the 
upsurge would be over, “magnified the conflict’s duration about sixfold, and its death 
toll at least sevenfold, while also exacerbating human rights abuses, humanitarian 
suffering, Islamic radicalism, and weapons proliferation in Libya and its neighbours”.115 
It is clear from these different assessments that the NATO intervention in Libya is a 
contested topic, partly because of its execution and consequences, partly because of 
the reasons that triggered the intervention. The difficulties surrounding the 
intervention allows us to put Turkish reactions in perspective and make us realise 
better why several other NATO countries also were unsure what position to take. 
Germany, for example, although a NATO member, had abstained during the Resolution 
1973 vote, together with BRIC countries Russia, China, India and Brazil. It declared in 
the UN not to support the military option because of “the danger of being drawn into a 
protracted military conflict that would affect the wider region.”116 Likewise, Germany 
decided not to take part in the military operations against Libya. 
As we will see now, Turkey was initially very much against NATO operations in Libya, 
but then radically changed its position by actually joining the operations. The lack of 
enthusiasm from the Turkish decision makers for NATO action was in accordance with 
the public opinion. Although in June 2011 54 percent of the Turkish population liked to 
see Gaddafi removed from power (with 25 percent wanting him to stay), and the same 
percentage would have supported an intervention to protect civilians, 64 percent 
disapproved of the (current) intervention by international forces (23 percent 
approved).117 This seems to indicate that specifically the NATO character of the 
intervention Libya was disliked by the Turks. 
Although Resolution 1973 was passed on 19 March, there had already been many 
speculations over international action in Libya in February. There were several reasons 
specific for Turkey during these weeks to be discontent with this development. In 
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regards to the French, who were leading the assertive voices in the West, the Turks 
had cool relations, as the French president Sarkozy had been actively opposing 
Turkey's EU-bid. With Gaddafi, on the other hand, relations had been up, as Turkey 
had in recent years been quickly expanding its economic investment in Libya. Because 
of this economic activity, there were 30.000 Turks in Libya, 5.000 of which were 
evacuated in a large operation finishing on the 23rd of February. 
All this time there were no official Turkish statements on either Gaddafi or the uprising, 
while the Turkish opposition called on Erdoğan to give back the Al-Gaddafi 
International Prize for Human Rights, which he, awkwardly, had received personally 
from the Colonel three months earlier.118 
On the 28 February Erdoğan explained his opinion about NATO countries moving 
towards an intervention. He believed that European countries had reacted weakly on 
Libya, and were now only looking for excuses to further their own interests. He 
continued: 
“The Libyan people are being punished with all kinds of sanctions and an intervention 
which could lead to large and unacceptable suffering. Now the press comes to us and 
asks [Turkey], very interesting, should NATO intervene in Libya? What kind of 
nonsense is that? What business does NATO have in Libya? NATO can only discuss to 
come into action when somebody intrudes a NATO member state. Apart from that, how 
can NATO intervene in Libya? Look, Turkey is against it. It is something unspeakable 
and unthinkable for us.”119 
He subsequently said that for Libya, as with all the other countries affected by the Arab 
Spring, it is the people themselves who should decide on the fate of the country and 
nobody else. Next he accused other countries to use terms such as democracy and 
human rights as an excuse to intervene, while actually being interested in economic 
gain and natural resources. Finally he stressed that, while being in contact with 
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Gaddafi on the issue, the well-being of the Libyans and the many Turkish nationals in 
Libya should come first.  
From that moment on we can find many instances in which Erdoğan repeated his 
opposition to NATO actions in Libya, quite consistently putting forward the same 
arguments. He generally put NATO's involvement in a context of Western imperialism, 
noting that “The Middle East and Africa have been viewed by the West as sources of oil 
and used as pawns in oil wars for decades.” and referred to the bad results of Western 
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq. The other part of his resistance was a concern for 
the humanitarian consequences of an intervention for the Libyan people, stressing that 
a foreign involvement would only deteriorate the situation. 120 
Likewise, Defence minister Vecdi Gönül stated that “I do not know what France is 
doing, but our politics are clear”, implying that France's policies were built on hidden 
motives of material gain. Turkey's policies, Gönül explained, “are about non-
interference in the internal affairs of others and to securing human rights and Turkey's 
interests in Libya.”121 
When on the 19th of March, two days after Resolution 1973 had been approved by the 
UN Security Council and France, the UK, the US and others had started bombing, 
Turkey kept speaking out against Western involvement in Libya. In another key 
statement, on the 22nd, Erdoğan declared that “when brothers are fighting brothers” 
in Libya, the solution cannot not be brought by ill willed external actors. “Currently our 
greatest wish is that the [Western] operations are concluded as soon as possible and 
that no more lives are lost. Our greatest desire is that the Libyan people can determine 
their own future themselves.”122 He also again raised his concern that NATO would 
wage war for the sake of wealth and natural resources.123 
After it was decided on the 24th that NATO would take over command over the 
operations in Libya by the end of the month, Turkey still kept denouncing the 
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intervention. Davutoğlu complained that the legal procedures for establishing a 
coalition “were not sufficiently respected”. Moreover, by saying that the bombings were 
going beyond what had been sanctioned by Resolution 1974, he joined ranks with 
other opposing parties such as Russia and China.124 
Meanwhile Erdoğan maintained that “we have been opposed to any unilateral action 
and we could never accept appeals such as that by the French minister for a new 
crusade. For Turkey, it's out of the question to shoot at Libyan people or drop bombs 
on the Libyan people. Turkey's role will be to withdraw from Libya as soon as 
possible.”125 At the same time, however, it was decided that Turkey would join the 
NATO forces by contributing five ships and one submarine for the naval blockade and 6 
F-16s for air superiority (not for ground attack operations). 
We have observed now, throughout several examples, that Turkey actively tried during 
February and March 2011 to keep NATO from intervening in Libya. This is intriguing, 
because if Turkey did not want to be involved in NATO's operations in Libya, it could 
also just have refrained from sending any support, like for instance Germany, Poland 
and Portugal did. Instead, it is very clear that it felt the need to campaign against its 
allies, challenging their preferences. As decisions in NATO are taken unanimously, 
Turkey could, and seemed willing to, veto intervention plans.126 All this means that 
Turkey estimated its interests in the Libyan case as high. We will see that evoking our 
previous findings on Turkey's strategic culture can provide some answers here, but 
also that Turkey's recalcitrant behaviour within the alliance and its subsequent military 
support in the operations hardly let itself be illuminated in a satisfying way. 
We established earlier how Turkey's new focus on the Middle East, as part of the 
diversification of its foreign policy, led to strengthened ties with many Arab countries. 
It may therefore seem that with opposing Western interventionism, it could bolster its 
image in the Arab world. Indeed, the months after the Arab Spring started Turkey's 
image had been on the rise as the 'Turkish model' was presented as a democratic role 
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model to which Arab protest movements could work towards.127 As all eyes were now 
on Turkey, it had to weigh carefully how to position itself. Turkey actively joined 
support for the regime changes in Tunisia and Egypt. In the Libyan case (and initially 
with Syria as well), Turkey was not so outspoken in its reaction. 
The NATO intervention was supporting the pro-democratic rebels in Libya, for whose 
Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts Turkey was supposed to be a role-model of Islamic 
democracy. This way, regardless the true intentions of Western actors in Libya, in 
supporting the Libyan opposition Turkey had, like in Egypt and Libya, another chance 
of using its soft power. At the same time, defending the autocratic Libyan regime 
would seriously undermine the credibility of Turkey's support for the Arab Spring. 
Although, of course, blocking a NATO intervention was not the same as supporting 
Gaddafi, it would have in fact jeopardised the chances of the Libyan rebels. In this 
view, upholding an international intervention, could tarnish Turkey's reputation as well. 
It is quite possible that the Turkish policy makers were aware of this, but that they did 
not believe the rebel movement in Libya had much chance; at the moment the NATO 
intervention was being discussed the rebels were looking seriously outgunned by the 
army of Gaddafi's long-standing regime. Moreover, the recently improved ties with 
Libya, which Turkey hesitated to just undo overnight, and the pending evacuation of its 
citizens, were further reasons for Ankara to wait to formulate any stance during most 
of February, while other countries had already started imposing sanctions on Gaddafi's 
regime. 
We saw how Turkey's long silence was followed by an active policy to try to prevent an 
internationalisation of the Libyan conflict in Libya. One can expect that Erdoğan's 
stress that the West should not engage with the internal issues of the Middle Eastern 
countries in order to gain wealth or resources, was not only appreciated by Arab rulers 
but also by the BRICs (all four countries abstained from voting on Resolution 1974). In 
this context Turkey's statements on imperialism and stress on non-interference in 
other's internal affairs seemed more reminiscent of the powers challenging the US' 
geopolitical position than of one of the Western allies. 
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Another way in which Turkey exhibited its ability to be a responsible regional power, 
was its much self-emphasised role128 as mediator between the regime and the rebels. 
This diplomatic route, had it been successful, would have fulfilled many of Turkey's 
preferences: it would have kept the West out of the internal business of the Libyans, it 
would have prevented further fighting while Turkey could have kept both its relations 
intact with the old regime and play a guiding role for the pro-democratic movements in 
Libya. And of course playing this key mediatory role would have gained Turkey much 
prestige on the global stage. 
It seems that Turkey's standing up to the West in Libya, should be seen as part of its 
effort to play a regional power role in the Middle-East, which was especially pressing 
because the Arab Spring launched Turkey as a role model of Islamic democracy. As the 
results of Turkey's manoeuvring in the Libyan case are not so clear, the general 
philosophy behind it gets obscured. Whereas its actions might at first glance seemed a 
chance to bolster its prestige in the Arab world, we discussed that this is certainly not 
clear-cut for pro-democratic movements of the Arab Spring. Still its efforts to present 
itself as standing up for the independence of Arab countries from Western interference, 
its lining up with the NATO-critical BRIC countries and its emphasis on its own 
mediatory initiatives are signs of a strong influence regional power narrative in its 
strategic culture. The fact that in the end Turkey let go of its efforts and consented to 
the NATO operations, however, marks limits of how far Turkey could or wanted to go 
following its independent course in the face of its NATO alignment. 
5.2 Ukrainian crisis (2014) 
The 2014 Russian occupation of Crimea after the Euromaidan Revolution and the 
broader crisis involving Ukraine, its pro-Russian movements and Russia itself, was a 
key event for NATO as it evoked memories of the East-West division which it had once 
been established for. 
Russia's actions against Ukraine have been explained in direct relation to the West and 
NATO and its eastward expansion. However, Kimberly Marten argues that Ukraine was 
nowhere near joining neither NATO nor the EU in the mid-long term, questioning the 
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(in this context) precipitate character of Russia's operations.129 Moreover, according to 
Eric Engle, Russia's actions were illegal in terms of international law: “Russia’s 
annexation was a violation of its treaty obligation under its Treaty of Friendship to 
respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity and under the universally recognized general 
principle of the territorial integrity of each State under customary international law.”130 
Indeed NATO regarded the Russian activities as such and harshly condemned them.  
In the wake of the crisis, NATO shifted its strategy towards Russia in several ways. Not 
only took the alliance measures to expand its military presence in Eastern Europe with 
the establishment of 'rapid reaction forces' and the deployment of larger numbers of 
troops. Additionally, many levels of cooperation between Russia and the West, 
including dialogue through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council were suspended. 
The crisis was also an important factor in the agreement at the Wales Summit of 2014 
for NATO countries to “reverse the trend of declining defence budgets and to raise 
them over the coming decade”.131 NATO countries also imposed economic and other 
sanctions on Russia and people involved in the events in Ukraine. 
We mentioned before that as part of its new diversified foreign policy orientation, 
Turkey had been steering for closer ties with Russia. Obviously, in the face of the 
Ukrainian crisis, Turkey, as part of the West, was expected to align with NATO's 
reactions to Russia. And indeed, when the Euromaidan Revolution began, Turkey did 
not support the old Ukrainian regime but instead condemned the use of force by 
president Janukovych against civilians and called for a peaceful, democratic solution. 
Next, Ankara recognised the new Ukrainian leadership while not accepting the results 
of the Russian-led referendum for Crimea's independence in March. Moreover, Turkey 
rejected both Russia's solution plan of federalising Ukraine and the pro-Russian 
rebellion that started in the Donbass.132 Finally, there was special concern for the 
Crimean Tatars, a Turkic, Muslim minority, which makes up 14 percent of the Crimean 
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population and which feared for their rights under Russian rule. As we will see below, 
the Tatar issue was a relatively important factor in Turkey's approach to the crisis. 
But although Turkey's position was critical towards Russia, it's stance was still 
moderate and different from its allies. One striking aspect is the fact that Turkey did 
not impose any sanctions on Russian individuals, businesses or officials. Not only did 
all the other NATO members do this, other Western oriented states such as Norway, 
Australia and Japan had followed suit.133 Instead, Turkey's economic ties with Russia 
seemed only to improve.  
In November 2014 Putin travelled with ten of his ministers to Turkey to discuss an 
action plan to triple bilateral trade over the next six years. Plans were made for joint 
industrial projects and energy cooperation (including not just Russian oil and gas but 
also Russian assistance to the construction of Turkey's first nuclear power plant in 
Akkuyu).134 Europe's cooling relations with Russia and the diminishing trade between 
the two blocks created opportunities for the Turkish economy. Russian sources 
confirmed this relation between Russia's trade with the EU and its trade with Turkey 
(not in the last place to show the West how useless its sanctions were). The Russian 
ambassador in Ankara remarked for instance: “What we can’t buy from Europe, we 
buy from Turkey. We want this to continue for the long term. Sanctions on Russia have 
actually increased the trade between our countries.”135 Putin himself complimented 
Turkey on its stance within NATO as well, saying: “our Turkish partners refused to 
sacrifice their interests for somebody else's political ambitions. I consider that to be a 
really well-weighed and far‑sighted policy.” He was glad this opened up new 
opportunities for trade with Turkey.136 
To what extend were these developments at variance with the breakdown of Russia's 
relations with the other NATO countries? According to Adam Balcer these signs of 
Turkish-Russian rapprochement did not mean much. Although Ankara described Russia 
as a strategic partner, this depiction of Turkish-Russian ties was exaggerated. In late 
2014 Balcer wrote that “the economic pillar in the relationship tends to be 
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overestimated and is likely to further weaken in the years ahead. Moreover, [..] the 
partnership lacks a solid social base, and more recently the two countries have 
witnessed serious divergences on a number of important geopolitical issues [including 
Syria, Egypt, the Armenian-Azeri conflict and the Russian annexation of Crimea].”137 
He continues that “In case of the new cold war between the US and the EU and Russia, 
Turkey - perhaps without strong conviction - will most probably align its policy with the 
West”138 
However, although Balcer gives several strong arguments for Turkey not to align with 
Russia, one can question if this would automatically put Turkey in a consenting position 
with the West. Turkey's increasingly independent course, driven by its strategic 
culture, would make its conformity with the West increasingly unpredictable. During 
the Ukrainian crisis, Dimitar Bechev analysed that “ties between Russia and Turkey are 
driven by pragmatism - or even naked opportunism.”139 But of course, one could also 
analyse Turkey's behaviour vis-à-vis NATO in this crisis from this perspective. 
What we would expect from Turkey's strategic culture is a behaviour that tries to 
balance its relations with different actors in such a way that it would benefit the 
interest of Turkey as independent player the most. In other words, while the support 
for NATO should be maintained, its ties with Russia should not suffer from it. One 
factor that might have changed the equation to the disadvantage of the Russians, and 
thus strengthened Turkey's intent to follow the West and Ukraine, was the issue of the 
Crimean Tatars. 
For the principles of neo-Ottomanism the fate of these representatives of Turkey's 
Ottoman heritage mattered. This is exactly how they were presented by the Turkish 
foreign ministry: “we are not looking at Ukraine solely from a Crimean perspective. But 
it is also true that Crimea has special importance for us. The Crimean Tatars speak 
Turkish and we have deep cultural ties with them. Historically, Crimea was a part of 
the Ottoman Empire.”140 The “special importance” of Crimea here does not stem from 
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Russia's strategic interest in the region with its military bases in the Black Sea and its 
consequences for Turkey's security. Nor is it related to the relation with Ukraine, the 
strategic interests of Turkey's NATO allies in Ukraine or to Russia's position there. 
Instead this special importance is based on the Ottoman Empire's century old 
possession of the peninsula and its people.141 This self-centred way of reasoning 
emphasises the power that is being transmitted from Turkey as a regional player. 
The real importance of the Crimean Tatars is not clear, however. Although the case 
was picked up extensively by both the Turkish media and Turkish politicians, Turkey 
was not being effrontery on the issue towards Russia. One statement by Davutoğlu 
read: “It is of great importance for us that Crimean Tatars live in peace together with 
other groups in Crimea as equal citizens within the unity of Ukraine.”142 The statement 
confirmed that Turkey sees Crimea as a part of Ukraine and also indirectly expressed 
the wish that with the Russian takeover no harm would be done to the Tatar minority. 
At the same time Davutoğlu made sure to fully avoid mentioning Russia directly, also 
when he continued that “Turkey is ready to provide every support for the bright future 
of both Ukraine and Crimea”. 
On another occasion he said: “Crimea should not be a territory of a military tension. 
On the contrary: it should be a peninsula of cultural peace and for this purpose we will 
do whatever it takes. Not only do we have a visionary and well-meant approach, we 
are also trying to take any measures that can help our Tatar brothers not to be 
affected by these conflicts.” Here again, Davutoğlu expresses support for the Tatars, 
but does not blame anyone in particular for what is going on.143 
From Erdoğan too we find moderate responses on the issue. At the NATO summit in 
Cardiff he declared that “Crimea's illegal annexation will not be recognised”144, 
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choosing a form not depicting Russia as active player. This contrasts with the official 
summit declaration, which talked about “Russia's aggressive actions against Ukraine” 
and “Russia's escalating and illegal military intervention”145, or with UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron's formulation that “what President Putin is doing is indefensible and 
wrong”146 
Later too, with the Minsk peace process underway, Erdoğan used soothing words. 
Apart from mentioning the Crimean Tatars he said: “about Russia's interference in 
Crimea, we directly told them [the Russians] that we cannot accept their claim that 
they “have historical rights there”. We also said this to dear Mr. Putin himself. [..] We 
shared our concerns with him. As Turkey, we are a member of NATO. Our thoughts on 
this point are already represented in the closing statement of the Cardiff summit.”147 
The fact that the language by these officials is cautious also stands out when we study 
the report the Turkish state itself commissioned on Russia's violations of rights against 
Crimean Tatars from June 2015. The findings from the academicians' work in Crimea 
include many cases of unlawful treatment and intimidation of individuals, pressure on 
Tatar political, social and religious organisations and Tatar educational institutions, 
deteriorating acceptance of the Tatar language and forced adoption of Russian 
citizenship. Moreover, the writers declare that they were constantly hindered and 
disturbed in their reporting, with the authorities even informing them that they could 
not vouch for the safety of researchers who did not follow the official program.148 But 
even though, as shown by the report, the Turkish government actually looked into the 
status of the Tatars, it did not press Russia hard on it. 
By avoiding the confrontation with Russia, Kemal Kaya argued that “Turkey de facto 
accepted Crimea's absorption by Russia.”149 Turkey's fear that a possible escalation 
would put military options on the agenda and would pressure it to make the choice to 
break with Russia, triggered only a tame response on the Tatar issue, notwithstanding 
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how much it fitted the neo-Ottoman discourse and the regional power narrative to 
stand up for this Crimean minority.  
We saw in this section that Turkey followed NATO's line on Russia only partially, as it 
tried to preserve its economic interests and its conveniently balanced diplomatic 
relations with both the US and EU and Russia. Whereas Turkey had been vocally 
impeding the allies on the Libya issue, its non-conformity went silent in this instance. 
Still the Ukrainian crisis shows Turkey as an actor which is not afraid to act 
independently and to carefully weigh the will of the alliance versus its own benefits.  
And thus Turkey joined the West in condemning Russia's actions against Ukraine, while 
at the same time aiming for increased economic cooperation with Russia. Of course, 
this phase lasted only for a limited time as Turkey's relations with Russia were deeply 
disrupted a year and a half later. Since the incident in December 2015 in which Turkey 
shot down a trespassing Russian military airplane at the Syrian-Turkish border, 
bilateral relations have been abysmal. 
The Syrian Civil War, in which context this incident happened, formed another case for 
both Turkey and NATO. The aspect we will focus on is the role of the Syrian Kurds in 
this conflict and its consequences for Turkey's relations with NATO. 
5.3. NATO support for the Kurds in Syria  
One instance in which the Turkish national interests clash with the interests of the 
alliance revolves around the Kurdish issue. The case gives us interesting information 
on Turkey's view on NATO. 
The militant Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), is fighting for the establishment of an 
independent Kurdistan in the southeast of Turkey, and has since it started its 
campaign 1984 almost constantly been in violent conflict with the Turkish state. Over 
the years, over 40.000 people have been killed in the conflict.150 The peace process 
between Turkey and the PKK which started in 2013, collapsed in July 2015. 
Although the PKK is regarded by NATO, the EU and the US as a terrorist organisation, 
support to Turkey from its allies has never been particularly high.151 Indeed, as Kurdish 
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opposition groups in Syria, not considered by the West as terrorist, were relatively 
successfully fighting Daesh in the Syrian Civil War, Western countries were not too 
happy with Turkey's renewed military campaign against the separatist Kurds within its 
own borders. In late 2015 Şaban Kardaş from the Turkish strategic NGO ORSAM wrote: 
“Once again, Turkey has opted to rely largely on its own capacity in its traditional fight 
against PKK terrorism. Even though Turkey was displeased with some of its NATO 
allies’ attitudes towards its fight against PKK, it conventionally refrained from carrying 
the issue into NATO’s agenda, for it considered the problem as essentially domestic 
one.”152 
However, treating the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a domestic insurgence proved 
impossible in the political context. The complicating factor is that the Kurdish issue in 
itself forms a transnational problem as the stateless Kurds live in parts of Turkey, 
Syria, Iraq and Iran. Consequently, there are many linkages between the PKK in 
Turkey and Kurdish independence movements in the neighbouring countries. 
Moreover, the PKK has in the past often retreated beyond the Turkish borders. It was 
therefore that the Turkish army, in times of weakness of the Saddam Hussein regime, 
entered the north of Iraq in 'hot pursuit' in order to combat PKK forces.153 In other 
instances, it had to deal with PKK training camps in Syria, supported by the Assad 
regime.154 
But this all happened years before the Syrian Civil War. On the complicated Syrian 
battleground the largely Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) have been successful 
in occupying large swaps of land in the north of the country. The YPG is considered the 
armed wing of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which itself is an important force of 
the Kurdish Supreme Committee, the government of Syrian Kurdistan. With the retreat 
of the Assad regime from the Kurdish areas and with a de facto Kurdish administration 
in place instead, a Syrian Kurdish independent, or at least autonomous state has come 
close. 
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Although NATO has been targeting Daesh with air strikes since September 2014, it 
has, not forgetting the long aftermath of the Afghanistan campaign, avoided putting 
forces on the ground. Of the local factions combating Daesh the YPG has been more 
successful than the other opposition groups or the Syrian and Iraqi regimes and is 
therefore an important strategic partner for NATO countries.155 Moreover, some, 
generally leftist, Western media outlets frame the YPG as more secular and democratic 
than Turkey, making it a preferred partner for the West in the Middle East.156 
Although NATO members such as France and especially the US were aware of the fact 
that the strengthening of the Kurdish factions could lead to the splintering of Iraq and 
Syria (in a post-war situation), they have generally been positive about the YPG's 
progress.157  
At the same time, Turkey has taken a very different perspective on the matter. It 
regards the YPG as the Syrian branch of the PKK and therefore as a terrorist 
organisation. After the Kurdish-Turkish peace process collapsed and the fighting in the 
southeast recommenced, the Turkish army started targeting the YPG as well. A 
particular intense series of bombardments of YPG positions in Syria began on 13 
February 2016, including areas of Aleppo which recently had been taken from Islamist 
rebels.158 While Western media cried foul, saying Turkey was undermining the fight 
against Daesh, Turkey maintained that its bombing was justified. 
In a pro-nationalist article by ORSAM, published in the following weeks, we can trace 
several arguments that led Turkey to behaviour which directly contradicted the policies 
of other NATO countries. At the base is the assumption that the YPG is not just 
committed to the fight in Syria, but has larger ambitions which directly threaten 
Turkey: “the YPG does not respect borders. It sees the war that it fights in Syria as 
supportive for the fight in the four countries where Kurds live. The fact that the YPG’s 
goals are not limited to Syria increases the security concerns of Turkey. These 
concerns are materialised in the examples of passing of arms, ammunition and fighters 
from Kamisli to Nusaybin, from Kobani to Suruc, and from Afrin to Hatay. According to 
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the YPG’s perspective, the fight in the north[, the southeast of Turkey,] can be 
supported more easily when the fight in Syria is over and the YPG gains political 
status.”159 
The West always maintained that the YPG is important for the fight against Daesh. 
Turkey's Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu confirmed at the NATO summit in Antalya 
in 2015 his concern with Daesh: “Turkey is the only member of the alliance to have 
borders with Daesh […] It poses a significant threat to us.”160 At other occasions 
Turkey has made clear, however, that this is no reason to work together with the 
Syrian Kurds because to Turkey both Daesh and the YPG are as terrorist organisations 
equally unacceptable. Moreover, it argued that the YPG's fight against Daesh should 
not be taken seriously as it is merely a way to bolster its image in the West and a way 
to legitimise its occupations of the Syrian regions where Kurds do not live. Another 
concern is that the YPG will pass on not just weapons to the PKK, but also experienced 
soldiers with high campaign planning capacities. Finally, Turkey feels a special concern 
for lands captured by the YPG which are inhabited not by Kurds but by other groups 
such as Arabs and Turkmens.161 
The Turkmens form an ethnical group which is close to the Turks. The special attention 
the AKP government is paying towards this group, not just in Syria, but in places as 
Iraq and Lebanon as well162, betray a particular concern with the Turkish nation, as 
opposed to the multinational Turkey that is being propagated in the regional power 
narrative. At first sight in may seem that we encounter here the Kemalist thinking in 
national unity, in which Turkey consisted of only Turks, and no other groups. This 
could explain why Turkmen, as Turkic kinsfolk around the Turkish border, are held in 
high esteem. However, this discourse on Turkmens, living outside of Turkey, actually 
also fits in a neo-Ottoman discourse. The fate of Turkmens can be invoked to refer to 
Turkey's historical and cultural ties with the region, underlining the regional power 
narrative. It enabled, for instance, Davutoğlu to declare to Turkmens during his visit in 
Lebanon: “You [Turkmens] are the bridge of friendship between Lebanon and Turkey. 
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[..] When you are in peace and in prosperity, we are also at peace. Your problem is our 
problem.”163  
The argument Turkey is making against the YPG in regard to the Syrian Turkmens 
does not fit into this line of thought though. The claims that the YPG is purposely 
harming Turkmens164, evoke the spirit of Turkish nationalism, and specifically one 
based on ethnicity. The threat for the Turkmens from the YPG is linked to the threat 
for the Turks from the PKK, highlighting the enduring national unity side of Turkey's 
strategic culture. 
The validity of all these arguments is unclear at this point, because precise links 
between the PKK and YPG are hard to nail down. We can identify, however, that by 
actively opposing the YPG and legitimising it with these arguments, by early 2016 
Turkey had gotten into a situation in which its own preferences came out against the 
NATO line. 
To recognise that Turkey was truly opposing NATO here we should note that especially 
the US was vocal on trying to stop Turkey's actions against the Kurds in Syria and to 
move it in accordance with the rest of NATO.165 Tellingly, the US State Department 
stated that the fighters of the YPG “are part of a number of groups that have been 
very effective in taking the fight against, or taking the fight, rather, to Daesh. [..] We 
still view YPG and PKK as two separate entities.”166  
Nor the rhetoric of the NATO member states, nor the fact that these allies were 
actually providing arms and strategic support to the Syrian Kurds impressed the AKP 
government to change direction. Instead it kept challenging and trying to convince its 
allies. In one line of argument, AKP spokesman Ömer Çelik tried to establish that the 
YPG thanked its position in Syria to the support it got from the Assad regime. Instead 
of furthering the case of oppositional forces in Syria, he was implying, NATO support to 
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the Kurds would be welcomed by the loathed Syrian regime.167 Moreover, proponents 
of the Turkish government also brought this together with the support for the YPG by 
the Russians (whose relations with both Turkey and NATO had hit a low point).168 
Erdoğan harshly criticised the alliance on 17 February 2016: “Are we not together with 
the US and NATO? Are we your friend, or the YPG and PYD? [..] Let us know, so that 
we don't need to talk about these issues with you. A friend should do what friendships 
require. We would do anything for our friends, but the people who do not see us as 
their friend should make themselves known.”169 Cengiz Çandar, a prominent Turkish 
left-wing journalist, targeted the government over this attitude and analysed the 
situation in the following way: 
“As a result of the erroneous policies of the current government, Turkey has failed to 
realise its plans in regards to the PYD and its 'symbolic' military force YPG in Syria. The 
struggle against the PYD and YPG has been pursued despite defying Washington. In a 
way, Turkey played game of “Either me, or him” in the 'political-diplomatic arena'. 
And, in this 'arena' it lost against Washington. The [Turkish] president, prime minister 
and the minister of the foreign affairs were all saying directly to Washington that “PYD, 
YPG, PKK are all same. They are terrorists. Choose us or them”. And the Washington 
Foreign Affairs spokesmen were resisting Ankara by saying “We don’t see it that way. 
In Syria they [the PYD] are our ally. We will keep supporting them.”170 
Note that the diplomatic dispute here is reduced to one between Turkey and the US, 
rather than the whole NATO alliance. According to Çandar, Turkey had positioned itself 
in a very non-cooperative way, pushing forward what it regarded as its national 
interests and pressuring the US to make a simplified “them or us” choice. After this 
quotation he went on arguing that the Turkish government would even instrumentalise 
the Daesh and separatist terrorist attacks in Turkey, to justify and propagate its 
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mücadele, aslında, Washington’a karşı verilmiştir. “Ya ben, ya o” biçiminde “siyasi-diplomatik arena”da yürütülmüştür. Ve, o “arena”da Washing-
ton’a karşı kaybedilmiştir. Cumhurbaşkanı, Başbakan, Dışişleri Bakanı, bir süredir Washington’u muhatap alarak “PYD, YPG, PKK’dır. Teröristtir. 
Ya ben, ya o” diyor; Washington ise Dışişleri sözcüleri aracılığıyla “Biz öyle görmüyoruz. Suriye’de müttefikimizdir. Desteklemeye devam ede-
ceğiz” açıklamalarıyla Ankara’ya karşı koyuyordu.” 
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foreign policy decisions by trying to prove its right on the YPG to the US. In Çandar's 
opinion, Turkey's harsh approach alienates it from its allies and weakens its 
international position. All this would attest to how far Turkey was willing to go to 
contest the alliance consensus. 
In terms of strategic culture, we observe behaviour in Turkey's foreign policy that fits 
the tendencies that we described before. Following the self-confidence that we 
encountered in the regional power narrative, we saw Turkey act independently from its 
allies. Although Turkey shared NATO's rejection of the Assad regime and has been 
collaborating with the general effort to destroy Daesh (both in line with its own 
interests), it opted for an independent course in the case of the Syrian Kurds, as it 
found its concerns for its national security too important to sacrifice for the sake of 
consensus within the alliance. It can of course be expected that any member state 
would lobby for its own strategic preferences, but the stubbornness of the Turkish 
position and especially the fact that in February 2016 it actively started to target the 
YPG in Syria is something which stands out. 
6. Conclusions 
In this thesis we have examined recent developments in Turkey's strategic culture and 
their manifestations and consequences in the context of Turkey's NATO membership. 
Early in the Davutoğlu years, we encountered his 'zero problems with neighbours' 
policy and the launch of NATO's new Strategic Concept in 2010. We next studied the 
cases of Libya, Ukraine and Syria for manifestations of the increasing importance of 
the regional power narrative in Turkey's strategic culture.  
On 5 May 2016 Davutoğlu announced his resignation, allegedly after losing a power 
struggle with president Erdoğan. With the sudden end of his political career, we can 
regard this event as the end of an era. We analysed Davutoğlu's ideas on international 
politics and Turkey's 'natural' geopolitical position, and it is clear that these ideas are 
very much in line with the behaviour we have seen in our case studies. While it was 
not him alone who shaped Turkey's thinking on foreign policy, we can be sure that with 
his departure others will come who will put their own mark on his ideas or who might 
take Turkey's foreign policy in a different direction.  
However, it is also evident that Davutoğlu's influence fits with the more general 
developments of Turkey's strategic culture. Although the years that he was advisor to 
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the AKP government, and subsequently foreign minister and prime minister, marked a 
decisive shift for Turkey abroad, we have also seen that the move away from the 
early-Republican thinking on international politics and its narrative of national unity 
had already been in motion since at least the times of the Özal governments of the 
1980s. 
Still the Davutoğlu years might proof the most decisive period, which marked 
particularly strong changes in Turkey's strategic culture and which saw the country 
make headway to take up its role as a regional power. 
In paragraph 2 we first examined theories on the concept of strategic culture. As noted 
there, our study does not yield us any solid forecasting on the future of Turkey's 
foreign politics. However, we did find that by analysing Turkey's strategic culture we 
can gain a certain range of probable behaviour. The national unity narrative and the 
regional power narrative, which we traced in paragraph 3 on the history of Turkey's 
strategic culture, and the ratio between these two, formed important points of 
reference which we used later in our case studies. By concluding at the end of the 
paragraph that the regional power narrative had come to play a more important role in 
recent years, we could better place Turkey's actions in NATO in the broader context of 
its foreign policy. Turkey's NATO membership, as we saw in chapter 4, was an anchor 
of its affiliation with the West, and in a way a monument of Turkey's 'old' foreign 
policy. The assumption is that if the regional power narrative has penetrated Turkey's 
thinking on security even here, the shift in strategic culture must have come a far way. 
While looking at Turkey's evaluation of the new Strategic Concept and the 60th 
anniversary of its membership to the alliance, we noticed that in Turkey's official 
discourse its steadfast dedication to NATO is still very much alive. Signs of regional 
balancing or an assertive, independent policy were limited. In the subsequent case 
studies, however, we saw that in practical situations Turkey uses different rhetoric and 
behaves differently. 
While I have tried to be careful not to just deterministically interpret any difference of 
opinion between Turkey and its NATO allies as a sign of the regional power narrative at 
work, I believe that I have shown that in many of the cases underlying relations with 
Turkey's changing strategic culture new foreign policy course do exist. Turkey has 
become more self-confident and has launched many foreign policy initiatives, revealing 
a daring to play an independent, regional role. In our case studies we saw that this 
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also includes that Turkey is confident to stand up against its NATO allies when it 
regards its own interests as different.  
Libya formed an interesting case because it showed Turkey, pressured by the 
international setting at the time, ambitiously set out to stand up against Western 
imperialism. Even though we saw that its exact strategies, related to its sudden 
importance during the Arab Spring, were hard to follow, the Libyan Civil War formed 
an instance of a Turkish foreign policy which was heavily based on the believe that it 
could play an important role as a regional power. Consequently its initiatives did not 
align at all with the plans of (some of) its NATO allies. Even though Turkey withdrew 
its opposition and even joined operation Unified Protector, the rhetoric with which it 
initially disregarded its allies, indicates how Turkey views itself within alliance. In the 
face of the independent, self-interest driven regional power narrative, Turkey might 
have use the alliance in some instances, when it aligns with its interests. When it does 
not align, it does not just abstain or oppose a policy, but will not hesitate to actively, 
publicly campaign the opposite. 
In the case of Ukraine Turkey did follow the other NATO countries in speaking out its 
support for Ukraine, but only to such an extent that it could still preserve the ties with 
Russia which it cared about. Moreover, it did not refrain from actually profiting from 
the economic sanctions the other NATO countries imposed on Russia in order to 
strengthen its own economic position. 
Turkey has confronted its allies most headstrong in the case of the Syrian Kurds. We 
saw that whereas NATO, headed by the US, regarded the YPG as essential allies 
against Daesh, Turkey has been very vocal in denouncing the group for its ties with the 
PKK. As this issue is the one we examined which is closest to home, the stakes are, 
understandably, higher for Turkey. Still, the persistence with which it has not just 
differed with NATO but has also tried to convince NATO of its rightness, demonstrates 
Turkey's conviction that it can and should decide on international issues by its own 
strength. The case was therefore a good indicator of how Turkey's new principles on 
security can strain its relation with NATO. 
Along the way we also saw that the heritage of the Ottoman Empire appeared as a 
factor in Turkey's actions, at the same time driving policy makers and being employed 
as a tool by these politicians. In the rhetoric on Ukraine, it was rather the fate of 
Crimean Tatars than the concerns of NATO strategists that appeared to worry Turkey. 
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Likewise, Turkey presented itself as a pre-eminent mediator in Libya and as protector 
of the Turkmens in Syria, partly on the premise that it had historical connections with 
these peoples. These are signs of the different view Turkey gained on foreign matters, 
as strongly identifying itself with the former empire. 
NATO counts among its members several countries with strong independent foreign 
policies, including the US, the UK and France. Turkey's reliance on the Ottoman Empire 
-a former great power- includes different aspects though. By approaching the Western 
alliance from the angle of the Ottoman outsider, which had always been regarded 
awkward at the Concert of Europe, Turkey may also place itself outside of the alliance. 
We saw that while Turkey's foreign policy 'expansion' to other regions such as the 
Middle East or Russia might fit the foreign policy of a matured regional power, the way 
it has been pursuing this goal has made for continuing clashes with NATO. 
By analysing this problem through the scope of strategic culture theories, this thesis 
shows that it is very likely that Turkey and NATO will continue to encounter conflicts 
such as the ones examined in paragraph 5. Turkey's strategic culture has evolved into 
such a form, that it has a strong tendency to tackle foreign policy issues unilaterally or 
together with casual partners. As the regional power narrative gains dominance, 
belonging to an alliance such as NATO is increasingly a tool which might be employed 
to further Turkey's interests, but can also easily be put aside when the circumstances 
are not fitting. This is obviously an attitude that will not be appreciated by some of the 
NATO members.  
That being said, we cannot be sure in what direction Turkey's internal developments 
and the turbulent geopolitical times are going to push the country. Changes in 
strategic culture are a slow process, but at the moment we can see how the 
strengthening regional power narrative is transforming Turkey's position. 
Developments to watch are the way how Turkey's leaders will be treating Davutoğlu's 
foreign policy legacy, and how developments in Turkey's political system, such as the 
new constitution which is in the works and a strong presidential system, for which 
Erdoğan has been lobbying, will influence the direction Turkey is moving. 
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